Defending Demaree: The Ex Post Facto Clause\u27s Lack of Control Over the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker by Levy, Daniel M.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 77 Issue 5 Article 17 
2009 
Defending Demaree: The Ex Post Facto Clause's Lack of Control 
Over the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker 
Daniel M. Levy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel M. Levy, Defending Demaree: The Ex Post Facto Clause's Lack of Control Over the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2623 (2009). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss5/17 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Defending Demaree: The Ex Post Facto Clause's Lack of Control Over the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines After Booker 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; M. Eng., 2003, B.S., 2002, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. I want to thank Professor John Pfaff for his invaluable guidance throughout the 
Note-writing process and my family—especially my loving wife—and friends for their support. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss5/17 
NOTES
DEFENDING DEMAREE:
THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE'S LACK OF
CONTROL OVER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AFTER BOOKER
Daniel M. Levy*
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
because they allowed a judge to depart from a mandatory range based on
facts not presented to a jury. As a solution, the Court modified the
Guidelines to be "advisory," yet curiously held that sentences were still
subject to appellate review for reasonableness. Given this tension, U.S.
courts of appeals are split on whether the Guidelines are "laws, "subject to
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This Note argues that
the Guidelines are advisory, given the level of deference the Supreme Court
and circuit courts have recently given to sentencing judges in departures
from the Guidelines, and thus they are not "laws" under the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
INTRODUCTION
The issue now, of course, is this: With the discretion that we have, how
much discretion are we going to be given? The only thing we are
working with is the notion of reasonableness; that is, is the sentence we
impose reasonable? We consult the Guidelines, we look at the other
factors, and we impose a sentence. Now, post-[United States v. ]Booker, I
write more sentencing opinions than I used to because I think it is
important that I explain my rationale for why I think a sentence in a
particular case is appropriate.l
U.S. District Judge Gregory A. Presnell of the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida discussed this issue of the extent of sentencing
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; M. Eng., 2003, B.S., 2002,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I want to thank Professor John Pfaff for his
invaluable guidance throughout the Note-writing process and my family-especially my
loving wife-and friends for their support.
1. Panel Discussion, Federal Sentencing Under "Advisory" Guidelines: Observations
by District Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 12 (2006) (remarks of U.S. District Judge of the
Middle District of Florida Gregory A. Presnell).
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discretion during a panel in 2006. He was referring to the 2005 decision,
United States v. Booker,2 in which the U.S. Supreme Court rendered the
then-mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the Sentencing Guidelines or
the Guidelines) advisory.3 The Court ordered that sentencing judges still
had to consult the Guidelines, but were free to consider other statutory
factors in fashioning their own sentences. 4 In an apparent point of tension,
the Court also held that, even though the Guidelines were advisory,
sentences were subject to mandatory appellate review for
unreasonableness. 5 In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia questioned the future
of sentencing discretion. On one hand, he wondered if unreasonableness
review would "preserve de facto mandatory Guidelines by discouraging
district courts from sentencing outside Guidelines ranges. ''6 On the other,
he asked, would this review become just a "formality, used by busy
appellate judges only to ensure that busy district judges say all the right
things when they explain how they have exercised their newly restored
discretion? ' 7
In United States v. Demaree,8 a case in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, the tension between "advisory" Guidelines and mandatory
appellate reasonableness review coalesced into a debate over whether
Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, commonly known as the Ex Post Facto
Clause, of the U.S. Constitution 9 applies to the Guidelines. The Ex Post
Facto Clause prohibits the application of any law that increases the
punishment for a defendant who committed a crime before that law came
into effect. 10 Faced with a choice between the version of the "advisory"
Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of a defendant's offense and a
later version in effect at the time of sentencing, does the Ex Post Facto
Clause prohibit using the later version if that version recommends a harsher
penalty? In Demaree, the Seventh Circuit answered no in an opinion by
Judge Richard A. Posner.II The court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause
did not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines because the Supreme Court
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See generally Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007:
The Supreme Court Holds-The Center Doesn 't, 117 YALE L.J. 1374 (2008); Kate Stith, The
Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J.
1420, 1476-84 (2008).
3. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court in part). For
information on the background and operation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(the Guidelines or the Sentencing Guidelines), see infra Part I.B.
4. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46; infra note 166 and accompanying text.
5. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia
expressed his frustration with this tension: "If the Guidelines are no longer binding, one
would think that the provision designed to ensure compliance with them would, in its
totality, be inoperative. The Court holds otherwise." Id. at 306 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
6. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
7. Id.
8. 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3055 (2007).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 ("No... ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
10. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798); infra Part I.A.1.
11. See Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795 ("We conclude that the [E]x [P]ost [Flacto [C]lause
should apply only to laws and regulations that bind rather than advise .... ).
2624 [Vol. 77
DEFENDING DEMAREE
rendered the Guidelines advisory in Booker.12 As advisory, they were not
"laws" under the Ex Post Facto Clause. 13 Regarding the forcefulness of
appellate review of sentences, the Seventh Circuit explicitly answered
Justice Scalia's question from his dissent in Booker. In the Seventh Circuit,
the Guidelines "nudge" a district court toward a sentencing range, but the
court's "freedom to impose a reasonable sentence outside the range is
unfettered."14
Other U.S. courts of appeals have taken the opposite view---the Ex Post
Facto Clause does apply to the Sentencing Guidelines. 15 They reason that,
notwithstanding Booker, the Guidelines still influence a judge's discretion.
As such, they are "laws" under the Ex Post Facto Clause. 16 Thus, a court
may not use a postoffense version of the Guidelines that specifies a harsher
penalty than a preoffense version did.' 7 This Note examines this emerging
conflict of whether the Ex Post Facto Clause should apply to the Sentencing
Guidelines after Booker. Part I provides background information on the
Supreme Court's Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence, the history and
operation of the Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court's Ex Post Facto
Clause jurisprudence regarding the Guidelines, the line of Supreme Court
cases, including Booker, that explain how the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
guarantee led the Court to its decision in Booker, and how the Court and
circuit courts have enforced appellate review of sentencing decisions since
Booker. Part II analyzes the conflict among U.S. courts of appeals and
commentators regarding whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to the
Sentencing Guidelines. Part III concludes that the Ex Post Facto Clause
should not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines because classifying them as
"laws" is synonymous with calling them "mandatory." Such a result would
cause a conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Booker that mandatory
Guidelines are unconstitutional. As a corollary, Part III argues that
reasonableness review has not rendered the Guidelines effectively
mandatory. Courts should continue to apply reasonableness review
leniently so as not to endanger the "advisory" status-and
constitutionality-of the Guidelines.
12. See id. at 794 (."Booker demoted the Guidelines from rules to advice .... .- (quoting
United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2005))).
13. See id. at 795.
14. Id. Note that this holding still includes the limitation of reasonability on the
sentence.
15. See infra Part II.B (discussing the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Sixth, Eighth,
and District of Columbia Circuits).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2008); infra Part
II.B.2.
17. See, e.g., Duane, 533 F.3d at 447; infra Part II.B.2.
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I. THE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, AND
BOOKER
Part I of this Note provides the history and legal framework with which
to analyze the issue of whether the Ex Post Facto Clause should control the
Sentencing Guidelines. Part L.A introduces the Ex Post Facto Clause and
examines recent Supreme Court decisions regarding parole guidelines and
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Part 1.B discusses the history and operation of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Sentencing Commission. Part I.C
discusses Miller v. Florida,18 a decision in which the Supreme Court held
that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to Florida's sentencing guidelines,
which at the time operated in the same "mandatory" manner as the Federal
Guidelines. Finally, Part I.D summarizes the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence leading to the decision in Booker. This part also discusses
sentencing decisions and practices after Booker.
A. Ex Post Facto Clause Jurisprudence
The U.S. Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws, but does not explain
what they are. Instead, judicial interpretation of the Constitution has given
the term its meaning. This part discusses Supreme Court cases that define
an ex post facto law. Part I.A.1 looks back to Calder v. Bull19 for the
historical definition. Parts I.A.2 and I.A.3 discuss the modem cases,
California Department of Corrections v. Morales20 and Garner v. Jones,21
that explain which administrative regulations are ex post facto laws.
1. The Historical Definition of an Ex Post Facto Law: Calder v. Bull
The U.S. Constitution frankly states, "[n]o... ex post facto Law shall be
passed."' 22 In the famous case of Calder v. Bull, Justice Samuel Chase held
that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the application of any law that
increases the punishment for a criminal defendant who commits an offense
before that law took effect.23 The Justices in Calder also explained that
there were two purposes for the Ex Post Facto Clause: (1) to restrain
federal and state legislatures from enacting vindictive legislation 24 and (2)
18. 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
19. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
20. 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
21. 529 U.S. 244 (2000).
22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
23. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) at 390 (Chase, J.) (stating that ex post facto laws include
"[elvery law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the crime, when committed"). This was one of four types of ex post facto laws
that Justice Samuel Chase enumerated. See id.; see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,
41-42 (1990) (reinforcing Calder).
24. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 389 ("[T]he advocates of [ex post facto] laws were
stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice. To prevent such...
acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State Legislatures, were prohibited
from passing.., any ex post facto law."); id. at 396 (Paterson, J.) ("[T]he power of passing
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to give fair warning and to permit people to rely on the laws until the
legislature changes them.25
2. The "Sufficient Risk" Test for an Ex Post Facto Law: California
Department of Corrections v. Morales
California Department of Corrections v. Morales set forth a general rule
to determine the scope of Justice Chase's definition of an ex post facto law.
In Morales, a California state court sentenced the defendant to life in prison
for first-degree murder.26 After his release on parole in 1980, the defendant
committed a second homicide, and the state court sentenced him to a term
of fifteen years to life in prison for second-degree murder.27 The defendant
was eligible for parole in 1990, but the parole board denied parole to the
defendant at his first hearing in 1989.28
California law in effect at the time of the defendant's second murder
required the California parole board to provide annual parole suitability
hearings to a prisoner every year after the first denial of parole. 29 However,
after the second murder, the state legislature passed a law authorizing the
parole board to defer the subsequent parole hearings for up to three years.30
The board could defer the hearing if (1) the inmate was responsible for
"'more than one offense which involves the taking of a life"' and (2) the
parole board enumerated its findings as to why it was unreasonable to
expect that it would grant parole in the intervening years. 31 The defendant
argued that the application of the new law increased his punishment by
possibly keeping him in prison longer, and thus violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 32
The Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant. 33 The Court declined
to apply the Ex Post Facto Clause to every "minor ... change[] that might
produce some remote risk of impact on a prisoner's expected term of
[ex post facto] laws should be withheld from legislators; as it is a dangerous instrument in
the hands of bold, unprincipled, aspiring, and party men, and has been [too] often used to
effect the most detestable purposes.").
25. See id. at 388 (Chase, J.) ("[N]o man should be compelled to do what the laws do not
require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws permit."); see also Miller v. Florida, 482
U.S. 423, 430 (1987) ("Thus, almost from the outset, we have recognized that central to the
ex post facto prohibition is a concern for 'the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint
when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was
consummated."' (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981))).
26. Cal. Dep't ofCorrs. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 502 (1995).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 502-03.
29. Id. at 503 (citing 19.77 Cal. Stat. 667).
30. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982)).
31. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5(b)(2)).
32. Id. at 505. The U.S. Supreme Court stated, "[R]espondent relies chiefly on a trilogy
of cases holding that a legislature may not stiffen the 'standard of punishment' applicable to
crimes that have already been committed." Id. One of the cases in the trilogy was Miller v.
Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987). Id. For a discussion of Miller, see infra Part I.C.
33. Morales, 514 U.S. at 504.
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confinement. '34 Instead the Court acknowledged that the issue is a "matter
of 'degree."' 35 The Court further held that the application of the new law to
the defendant violated the Ex Post Facto Clause if it produced a "sufficient
risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to [his] crimes. '36
The Court then decided that in the case of the defendant and similar
criminals, the new law did not produce such a risk.37 In order to delay the
defendant's hearing under the new law, the parole board would have to state
the reasons why it thought parole would be unreasonable in the intervening
years.38 Thus, the Court basically saw the new law as a way for the board
to skip parole hearings that were not likely to result in a grant of parole. 39
3. The Two-Pronged Test for an Ex Post Facto Law: Garner v. Jones
Garner v. Jones built upon Morales by explaining a two-pronged
framework for analyzing which administrative regulations qualify as ex
post facto "laws." In Garner, the respondent escaped from prison five
years after he had begun serving a life sentence in Georgia for committing
murder.4° He then committed another murder over two years after his
escape, resulting in another life sentence. 41
Georgia law required the State's Board of Pardons and Paroles (the
Georgia Parole Board) to consider inmates serving life sentences for parole
seven years after imprisonment. 42  After this initial review, state law
authorized the Georgia Parole Board to set the intervals between subsequent
parole hearings.43  At the time the respondent committed the second
murder, the Georgia Parole Board's rules stated that the board would
reconsider inmates for parole every three years. 44  After the respondent
returned to prison after the second murder, the board amended its rules to
provide an eight-year minimum interval between reviews for inmates
serving life sentences.45
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the
retroactive application of the amended rule violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause.46  The court reasoned that the group of inmates serving life
34. Id. at 508.
35. Id. at 509 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 509-11. The Court also pointed out that, under the new law, the parole board
could still conduct yearly reviews for criminals with a more realistic chance of parole. See
id. at 511.
38. See id. at 511; supra note 31 and accompanying text.
39. Id. at 512 ("[T]he amendment simply allows the Board to avoid the futility of going
through the motions ... on a yearly basis.").
40. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 247 (2000).
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-45(b) (1982)).
43. Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-45(a)).
44. Id. (citing GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.05(2) (1979)).
45. Id. (citing GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.05(2) (1985)).
46. Id. at 248-49.
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sentences was likely to be much larger than the group of double murderers
at issue in Morales.47 Thus, the court concluded that the retroactive
application of the amended parole rule would increase the length of
incarceration for many inmates.48
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling49 and set forth
a two-pronged test for whether the retroactive application of an amended
rule violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. First, the application is a violation if
the amended rule shows a significant risk of increased punishment on its
face.50 The Court emphasized that this inquiry should focus on the entire
system of rules rather than just the singular amended rule. 51 Second, if the
terms of the rule do not display this risk, the complainant must
"demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule's practical implementation
by the agency charged with exercising discretion, that its retroactive
application will result in a longer period of incarceration than under the
earlier rule." 52 The Court also reinforced its holding in Morales, stating
that the focus of the inquiry should not be on whether a change in the rule
produces an ambiguous disadvantage for the offender, but on whether the
change increases the penalty for a crime. 53
In Garner, the Supreme Court found that the Seventh Circuit erred by not
considering an internal policy of the Georgia Parole Board for expedited
consideration. 54  The Court reasoned that any particular inmate could
invoke this policy should that inmate think that changed circumstances or
new information warranted a grant of parole. 55
In Morales and Garner, the Supreme Court analyzed the applicability of
the Ex Post Facto Clause to parole guidelines. However, the Court
employed very broad language, and thus this Note uses this legal
framework to analyze whether the Ex Post Facto Clause controls another set
of administrative regulations--the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
47. Id. at 249.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 255 ("When the rule does not by its own terms show a significant risk,
[proceed to the second prong].").
5 1. See id. ("ITlhe general operation of the Georgia parole system may produce relevant
evidence and inform further analysis on the point.").
52. Id.
53. See id. at 250 ("The controlling inquiry, we determined, was whether retroactive
application of the change in California law created 'a sufficient risk of increasing the
measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes."' (quoting Cal. Dep't of Corrs. v.
Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995))).
54. See id. at 256 ("At a minimum, policy statements, along with the Board's actual
practices, provide important instruction as to... whether.., the amendment ... created a
significant risk . .
55. See id.
2009] 2629
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B. The History and Operation of the Sentencing Guidelines
Before analyzing the applicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the
Sentencing Guidelines, this Note discusses the origin and operation of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Part I.B. 1 first describes the creation of the
Sentencing Commission. Part I.B.2 then looks at how the Sentencing
Commission built the Guidelines and how they operate. These subsections
deal only with mandatory Guidelines before Booker, unless otherwise
noted.
1. The Origin of the Guidelines
From the late nineteenth century to approximately 1970, judges exercised
essentially unchecked discretion when imposing sentences.5 6 The reason
for this discretion was that the dominant theory of punishment was
rehabilitation rather than retribution or deterrence. 57 Sentencing judges
viewed criminals as patients in need of individualized sentences. 58
However, near the end of this era, experience showed that this
rehabilitative sentencing model did not work.59 In short, there was no way
to tell when the defendant was rehabilitated. 60 Critics argued that
sentencing discretion led to significant differences in the lengths of
sentences for similar offenders. 6' Both judges and lawmakers led the
movement for sentencing reform that included tighter legislative controls,
guidelines, and review procedures. 62
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), 63
establishing the U.S. Sentencing Commission (the Sentencing Commission
56. See James R. Dillon, Doubting Demaree: The Application of Ex Post Facto
Principles to the United States Sentencing Guidelines After United States v. Booker, 110 W.
VA. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2008) (citing Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 389 (2006)); see also Michael Buescher, Note, Rebuilding the Safety
Mechanism: Does 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) Violate the Separation of Powers?, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1065, 1070 (2007).
57. See Dillon, supra note 56, at 1038 ("From the late nineteenth century until around
1970, the federal criminal justice system operated on a 'medical' model in which criminal
offenders were viewed primarily as patients in need of care and rehabilitation by the penal
system." (citing Dufresne v. Baer, 744 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11 th Cir. 1984))).
58. See id. (citing Berman, supra note 56, at 389).
59. See id. at 1039.
60. See id. ("'There is simply no way to know when "rehabilitation" has occurred in an
individual."' (quoting Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process,
84 YALE L.J. 810, 827 (1975))).
61. See id. at 1039-40 (citing Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The
New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883-84 (1990)).
62. See id.; see also Richman, supra note 2, at 1385.
63. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). A little over 90% of active
federal district judges were appointed after Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act. See
Stith, supra note 2, at 1496 n.333. Including senior judges, the percentage of judges
appointed after the Guidelines took effect is more than 66%. See id.
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or the Commission),64 which has many duties. The Commission must
establish federal sentencing policies that satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), 65
which specifies four purposes of sentencing. These purposes are (1)
retribution and respect for the law, (2) deterrence of future criminal
conduct, (3) incapacitation of the offender, and (4) rehabilitation of the
offender. 66  The Commission's sentencing policies must also balance
providing "certainty and fairness" and "avoiding unwarranted sentencing
disparities" among similarly situated defendants with "maintaining
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences" when previously
unconsidered mitigating or aggravating factors exist.67  Finally, the
Commission's policies must "reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement
in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice
process." 68
The Commission also performs duties related to the maintenance of its
sentencing policies. The Commission must measure the effectiveness of
sentencing, penal, and correctional practices in meeting the purposes of
sentencing in § 3553(a)(2). 69 The Commission shall also promulgate the
Sentencing Guidelines and general policy statements regarding the use of
the Guidelines. 70 The SRA instructs the Commission to consult with
various federal criminal justice authorities and to revise the Guidelines as
necessary based on public comments 71 and new data.72
In addition to establishing the Commission, the SRA commands courts to
impose sentences that are "sufficient, but not greater than necessary. '73 In
particular, courts must consider (1) "the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant," 74 (2) the four
factors that the Commission considers when promulgating the Guidelines, 75
(3) the available sentences, (4) the Sentencing Guidelines, (5) any policy
statement of the Commission, (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparity among similarly situated defendants, and (7) the need to provide
64. See Sentencing Reform Act, 98 Stat. at 2017 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§
991-998 (2006)).
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A).
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006). For a brief overview of these theories of
punishment, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES
82-90 (3d ed. 2005).
67. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B).
68. Id. § 991(b)(1)(C).
69. Id. § 991(b)(2).
70. See id. § 994(a).
71. The Sentencing Commission posts notices in the Federal Register regarding
proposed amendments to the Guidelines, policy statements, or commentary; these notices
request comments from the public. See, e.g., Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts,
73 Fed. Reg. 4931, 4932 (proposed Jan. 28, 2008).
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). For a complete list of the Commission's duties, see id. §
994.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
74. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
75. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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restitution to the victims of the offense.76 However, before Booker, the
SRA mandated that the court follow the Guidelines unless it found other
factors that the Commission did not consider in formulating a particular
sentence. 77
To depart from the "mandatory" Guidelines, a judge, as fact finder, could
consider evidence that would be inadmissible during a criminal trial. 78 The
evidence only needed to have "sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
probable accuracy," 79 but the defendant still had many procedural
protections that the judge had to work to overcome. Specifically, the
defendant and the prosecution could present evidence regarding particular
sentencing factors.80  The judge had to find all disputed facts by a
preponderance of the evidence. 8' The defendant also had the right to appeal
a sentence for a number of reasons, including that the sentence was above
the Guidelines' range. 82 Before Booker, appellate courts reviewed district
court sentences de novo.8 3 In combination with the SRA's command to
follow the Guidelines,8 4 these procedural protections under a "mandatory"
sentencing regime provided a good basis for a court to hold that the
Guidelines had the force of law, as this Note later discusses. 85
2. The Operation of the Guidelines
The Sentencing Commission's basic philosophy in constructing the
Guidelines focused on using empirical data to determine appropriate
sentences.8 6 The Commission recognized that a major hurdle in eliminating
sentencing disparity was that different theories of punishment produced
different sentences.8 7  For example, consider a bank robber. A "just
deserts" theorist would impose a sentence based on the moral culpability of
a bank robbery.88 A crime-control theorist would imprison the robber until
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000) ("[T]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and
within the [Sentencing Guidelines] range.., unless the court finds.., an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance ... not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a [different] sentence ....").
In 2005, in United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held the "mandatory" Guidelines to
be unconstitutional and excised this section of the statute. See infra Part I.D.2.
78. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. background (2008) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 3661 and collecting cases regarding such admissible evidence).
79. See id. § 6Al.3(a).
80. See id.
81. See id. § 6AI.3 cmt. background; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
226 (2005).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3) (2006).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000). See generally infra Part I.D.2.
84. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
85. See generally infra Part I.C.
86. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1AI.3 editorial note (The Basic
Approach para. 11).
87. See id. (The Basic Approach para. 9).
88. Cf ROBINSON, supra note 66, at 86 ("An actor. .. is punished according to the
degree of his or her blameworthiness, no more and no less.").
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the risk that the robber would commit another robbery was sufficiently low,
regardless of the moral culpability of the crime. 89 The Commission sought
to minimize this conflict9" by relying on a large amount of empirical data.91
The Commission analyzed the data and identified relevant distinctions in
offenders' situations that seemed to affect sentencing decisions. 92 These
distinctions were "ones that the community believe[d], or... found over
time, to be important from either a just deserts or crime control
perspective. ' 93 The Commission then adjusted the sentences for specific
crimes either because of statutory directives or because it detected
inconsistencies in treatment. 94
The Guidelines use a sentencing table that identifies a range of
punishment based on the defendant's "criminal history category" and
"offense level."'95 The criminal history category is a number from one to
six and is based on the offender's prior convictions.96 The offense level is a
number from one to forty-three. 97 The defendant's offense level starts with
a base number that the Commission defines for each crime in chapter 2 of
the Guidelines. 98 A court then applies aggravating or mitigating factors that
the Commission defines separately in chapters 2 and 3 of the Guidelines.99
These factors adjust the base offense level up or down accordingly.100 The
court then finds the appropriate range on the sentencing table by locating
the intersection of the final offense level and the criminal history
category. 1° 1  As this part has discussed, the Guidelines were fairly
mandatory at their inception, so a district court judge had little say in the
resulting sentence. The next part of this Note examines a decision in which
the Supreme Court logically concluded that the Guidelines were "laws"
under the Ex Post Facto Clause because they were mandatory.
C. The Ex Post Facto Clause's Control over "Mandatory"
Sentencing Guidelines
Part L.A set forth the controlling tests for whether administrative
regulations are ex post facto laws, and Part I.B described the origin and
operations of the Guidelines. This part examines Miller v. Florida, a
89. Cf id. at 84 (discussing an extreme form of crime control where a pickpocket's
hands are cut off).
90. For a more detailed discussion on this conflict, see id. at 87-89.
91. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Al.3 editorial note (The Basic
Approach para. 11).
92. See id. (The Basic Approach paras. 11-12).
93. See id. (The Basic Approach para. 13).
94. See id. (The Basic Approach para. 14).
95. See id. § 5A.
96. See id. § 4A.
97. See id. § 5A.
98. See id. § 1B 1.1 (b). See generally id. § 2.
99. See id. § 1Bl.1(b)-(e).
100. See id.
101. See id. § 5A.
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decision in which the Supreme Court found the Guidelines, as mandatory,
to be ex post facto laws.
The Supreme Court decided Miller in 1987, unanimously holding that the
Ex Post Facto Clause prohibited increasing a defendant's sentence by
retroactively applying Florida's sentencing guidelines. 10 2 In Miller, the
guidelines in effect on the defendant's date of offense specified a
presumptive sentence of 3.5-4.5 years. 10 3 The guidelines in effect at the
time of sentencing specified a range of 5.5-7 years. 104 The trial court used
the later version of the Florida guidelines to sentence the defendant to seven
years in prison. 10 5
The Supreme Court held that the trial court violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause by using the later version of the state guidelines, which had the
"force and effect of law" and "substantially disadvantaged" the
defendant. 106 The Court relied on the fact that, if the sentencing judge
imposed a sentence of seven years under the old guidelines, he would have
been required to provide clear and convincing reasons for departing from
the presumptive range. 10 7 Under the new guidelines, the seven year
sentence fell within the presumptive range, and thus the judge would not
have had to provide any reasoning. 10 8 The Court held that this change
substantially disadvantaged the defendant because it foreclosed his ability
to challenge a sentence longer than his presumptive sentence under the old
guidelines. 10 9 The Florida sentencing guidelines in Miller operated in a
manner virtually identical to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 1'0 As a
result, after Miller, all of the U.S. courts of appeals agreed that the Ex Post
Facto Clause also barred the retrospective application of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to increase a defendant's sentence.I 1
102. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1987). The Florida sentencing guidelines
operated in much the same way as the Federal Guidelines. See infra note 110 and
accompanying text. In subsequent decisions, all of the U.S. courts of appeals agreed that the
reasoning in Miller v. Florida applied to the Federal Guidelines. See infra note 111 and
accompanying text.
103. Miller, 482 U.S. at 424.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 432, 435. It is important to note that the Court in California Department of
Corrections v. Morales abrogated the "substantially disadvantaged" test. 514 U.S. 499, 506
n.3 (1995); see also supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. However, the outcome in
Miller would have remained the same under the test in Morales. Morales, 514 U.S. at 506
n.3.
107. Miller, 482 U.S. at 432; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005)
(discussing the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for the Federal Guidelines); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. background (2008) (setting forth the
Commission's belief that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is appropriate for the
Guidelines).
108. Miller, 482 U.S. at 432-33.
109. See id.
110. See Dillon, supra note 56, at 1047.
111. United States v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216, 218 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v.
Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Nagi, 947 F.2d 211, 213 n.l (6th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other
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Originally, neither Congress nor the Sentencing Commission believed
that the Ex Post Facto Clause would apply to the Guidelines. 112 In 1992,113
the Sentencing Commission responded to Miller and the subsequent
reaction from the courts of appeals by amending the Guidelines. 14 The
Sentencing Commission added § 1B1.11, which specified that the
sentencing court must use the version in effect on the date of sentencing
unless doing so violated the Ex Post Facto Clause."15 Section IB.11
instructs that if a court finds an Ex Post Facto Clause violation, it must use
the Guidelines in effect on the date of the offense.116 Note that § lB.11
does not dictate that the Sentencing Guidelines are subject to the Ex Post
Facto Clause. As Part I.C showed, that question is for the courts. However,
it is still an open question whether the Ex Post Facto Clause controls the
current Sentencing Guidelines, given that they are no longer mandatory.
The next section of this Note discusses the line of Supreme Court cases that
led to this seismic shift in the Guidelines and the aftermath in the lower
courts.
D. The Sixth Amendment and the Sentencing Guidelines
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution protects a criminal defendant's
right to a "speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."'' 17 This subsection
of this Note summarizes the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence as applied to the Sentencing Guidelines. Part I.D. 1 discusses
Apprendi v. New Jersey118 and Blakely v. Washington,"l9 two cases in
which the Supreme Court clarified the role of the jury in sentencing
decisions. Next, Part I.D.2 examines the Booker decision, which rendered
the Guidelines advisory. Parts I.D.3 and I.D.4 review Rita v. United
States,120 Gall v. United States,121 and Kimbrough v. United States,122 three
grounds by United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Young,
932 F.2d 1035, 1038 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450, 1452 n.3
(10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Morrow, 925 F.2d 779, 782-83 (4th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v.
Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1042 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Swanger, 919 F.2d 94, 95
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Worthy, 915 F.2d 1514, 1516 n.7 (1lth Cir. 1990); United
States v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1990)).
112. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 11B1. 1 cmt. background (2008) (citing S.
REP. No. 98-225, at 77-78 (1983)).
113. See id. § 1Bl.l hist. n.
114. See id. § B 1.1 1 cmt. background ("While the Commission concurs in the policy
expressed by Congress, courts to date generally have held that the [E]x [P]ost [F]acto
[C]lause does apply to sentencing guideline amendments that subject the defendant to
increased punishment." (emphasis omitted)).
115. See id. § IB1.ll(a)-(b)(1).
116. See id. § 1B1.11(b)(1). Section 1B. 11 (b)(2)-(3) of the Sentencing Guidelines is
outside of the scope of this Note. See infra note 290.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
118. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
119. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
120. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
121. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
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post-Booker cases where the Supreme Court clarified the standards of
judicial review for sentencing decisions both within and outside of the
Guidelines.123 Finally, Part I.D.5 discusses sentencing data and decisions in
U.S. district and circuit courts since Gall and Kimbrough.
1. The Role of a Jury in Sentencing: Apprendi v. New Jersey
and Blakely v. Washington
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the defendant admitted to firing several
bullets into the home of an African American family that had just moved
into an all-white neighborhood.124 The defendant pled guilty to two counts
of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one
count of third-degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb. 125
Under New Jersey law, the defendant's maximum sentence for these crimes
was twenty years. 126
The state requested that the court enhance the defendant's sentence on
the ground that he committed the offense with a biased purpose. 127 With
this enhancement, the defendant's maximum sentence would have been
thirty years. 128  At an evidentiary hearing, the judge found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the biased purpose enhancement
applied. 129 The defendant appealed, arguing that the Due Process Clause of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 130 required a
jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he acted with a biased
purpose. 131
The Supreme Court held that the combination of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause 132 and the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee
mandated that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime, must be... submitted to a jury, and proven
122. 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).
123. See generally Stith, supra note 2, at 1484-94.
124. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
125. Id. at 469-70 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-4a, 2C:39-3a (West 1995)).
126. Id. at 470. The twenty-year maximum was based on the five- to ten-year sentences
for the two second-degree counts running consecutively and the three- to five-year sentence
for the third-degree count running concurrently. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2),
2C:43-6(a)(3)).
127. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e)). In the plea agreement, the state reserved
the right to request this enhancement, and the defendant reserved the right to challenge it. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id, at 471.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of the law ....
131. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law .... ). The Court relied on precedent involving the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause but applied the Fourteenth Amendment to the state to reach
the same conclusion in this case. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
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beyond a reasonable doubt."1 33 The Court largely relied on historical
principles for this holding. 134 In addition, the Court reasoned that courts in
the past did not differentiate between an "element" of an offense and .a
"sentencing factor."' 35 Historically, a court submitted all elements of the
offense to the jury. 136 In a final point, the Court stated that judges have
always exercised sentencing discretion within the permitted statutory
range.' 37
In Blakely v. Washington, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree
kidnapping involving domestic violence and the use of a firearm 1 38
Washington state law limited the sentence for such a crime to ten years. 139
However, Washington's Sentencing Reform Act further limited a judge's
discretion to a sentencing range of forty-nine to fifty-three months. 140 This
Act also provided that a judge could impose a sentence above the standard
range for "'substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional
sentence."' 1 41 The judge in Blakely imposed an above-guidelines sentence
of ninety months, justifying the decision on the ground that the petitioner
acted with "'deliberate cruelty."'' 142 The judge supported this determination
with thirty-two findings of fact resulting from a bench hearing.143
The Supreme Court held that the increased punishment violated the Sixth
Amendment. First, the Court recited its rule from Apprendi: "' [o]ther than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.""' 144 Next, the Court held that the
statutory maximum is the sentence that the judge may impose "solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant."' 45 The forty-nine to fifty-three month sentence reflected all the
facts in the jury verdict and defendant's plea agreement. 146 Thus, the judge
133. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6
(1999)).
134. Id. at 477 ("[T]rial by jury has been understood to require that 'the truth of every
accusation ... be confirmed by... twelve of [the defendant's] equals and neighbours .... '
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343)). "[I]n criminal cases[,]... the
formula 'beyond a reasonable doubt' seems to have occurred as late as 1798." Id. at 478.
135. See id. at 478 ("Any possible distinction between an 'element' of a felony offense
and a 'sentencing factor' was unknown to the practice of... trial by jury ...." (citing 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 134, at *368)).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 481.
138. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 298-99 (2004).
139. Id. at 299 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.20.021(1)(b), .030(3) (West 2000)).
140. Id. (citation omitted).
141. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2)).
142. Id. at 300 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 301 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
145. Id. at 303.
146. See id. at 304.
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could not have found additional facts at the bench hearing to increase the
defendant's sentence. 147
2. The Sentencing Guidelines Become "Advisory":
United States v. Booker
In United States v. Booker, a jury convicted the defendant of possessing
at least 50 grams of crack cocaine based on evidence that he had carried
92.5 grams of crack in his bag. 148 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
specified a sentence of 210-262 months in prison. 149 However, the judge
imposed a sentence of 360 months. 150 The judge supported this sentence
with the finding that the defendant possessed 566 grams of crack in addition
to the original 92.5 grams in his bag. 151
In the first opinion of the Court,152 Justice John Paul Stevens applied the
holding in Blakely153 to the Sentencing Guidelines and declared their
mandatory nature unconstitutional.154 First, Justice Stevens noted that a
judge has always had discretion to impose a sentence within a defined,
statutory range. 155 However, the Sentencing Guidelines bound a judge to
its range, 156 subject to departures in cases where the judge found
aggravating or mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence.157 Similar to the holding in Blakely, Justice Stevens held that the
district court violated the Sixth Amendment by departing from the
Sentencing Guidelines' mandatory range based on additional facts--the
extra 566 grams of crack--that the jury did not consider. 158  Thus, an
appellate court should have reversed the judge's sentence because he should
have had no factual basis for the departure from the Guidelines. 159
In the second opinion of the Court in Booker, Justice Stephen Breyer laid
out two remedial options in light of Justice Stevens's opinion. The first was
that the Court could interpret the sentencing statute to require a jury to find
any fact-beyond a reasonable doubt--that a sentencing judge might use to
147. See id. ("The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional [ninety]
month sentence solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea.").





152. Justices Scalia, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined
Justice John Paul Stevens's opinion. See id. at 226 & n.*. There were two majority opinions
because Justice Ginsburg also joined Justice Stephen Breyer's remedial opinion. See id. at
244 & n.* (Breyer, J.). Chief Justice William Rehnquist, along with Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy, also joined Justice Breyer. See id.
153. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
154. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 232-33, 243-44 (Stevens, J.).
155. Id. at 233.
156. Id. at 234.
157. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2004)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 234-35.
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increase the defendant's sentence. 160 Alternatively, the Court could render
the Sentencing Guidelines advisory by excising the appropriate sections of
the sentencing statute. 161  The sections at issue were 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b)(1), which directed that the sentencing court "'shall impose a
sentence of the kind, and within the range,"' 62 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e),
which set forth a de novo standard of review on appeal for departures from
the applicable Guidelines' range.163  The Court chose to make the
Guidelines advisory.164 Justice Breyer reasoned that Congress would have
preferred this remedy in light of the unconstitutionality of mandatory
Guidelines. 165 Thus, the Court held that the sentencing court must consider
the Sentencing Guideline range, but was also free "to tailor the sentence in
light of other statutory concerns." 166 The Court also held that appellate
courts must review whether sentences were unreasonable with regard to the
same statutory concerns. 167  As discussed in the Introduction, pairing
advisory guidelines with mandatory review for reasonableness created
ambiguity and tension. 168 Nevertheless, the Court held that, as advisory,
the Sentencing Guidelines would not constrain the judge's range of
discretion any further than the statutory sentencing range. 169 The Court
then concluded that, because a defendant has no right to a jury
determination of a sentence within the judge's discretion, the Guidelines
would not violate a defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial.170
3. Appellate Review of a Sentence Within the Guidelines:
Rita v. United States
In Rita v. United States, a jury convicted the defendant of perjury,
making false statements, and obstruction of justice. 171  Using the
160. See id. at 246 (Breyer, J.).
161. Id. Even though the Justices disagreed on the proper remedy, they unanimously
agreed that rendering the Guidelines advisory would solve the Sixth Amendment problem.
See id. at 259.
162. Id. at 234 (Stevens, J.).
163. See id. at 259 (Breyer, J.).
164. Id. at 245. The U.S. Department of Justice reacted disagreeably to the Booker
decision, directing all federal prosecutors to ensure compliance with the Guidelines by any
means. See Richman, supra note 2, at 1394-95.
165. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246-58.
166. Id. at 245-46. The other statutory factors are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
167. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 261 ("Those [§ 3553(a)] factors in turn will guide appellate
courts ... in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable."). But see Gall v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007) ("Our explanation of 'reasonableness' review in the
Booker opinion made it pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of
review now applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions." (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at
260-62)).
168. See supra notes 5, 167 and accompanying text.
169. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (Stevens, J.).
170. Id.
171. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (2007).
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Guidelines, the presentence report 172 calculated a recommended sentencing
range of thirty-three to forty-one months in prison. 173 The report also noted
that there were no circumstances warranting a deviation from the
recommended range. 174 After the sentencing hearing, the judge concluded
that a thirty-three month sentence was appropriate. 175 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence, stating that a sentence
that fell within the guidelines was presumptively reasonable. 176
The Supreme Court held that a circuit court could use a presumption of
reasonableness to review a district court's sentence falling within the
Guidelines. 177 The Court reasoned that the presumption was warranted
because both the district court judge and the Sentencing Commission
reached the same conclusion regarding the proper punishment. 178 The
Court also stressed that only an appellate court, not a district court, may use
this presumption.179 Further, the Court stated that this nonbinding appellate
presumption does not require that the judge impose the sentence, 180 but
conceded that the presumption may encourage judges to impose sentences
within the Guidelines' prescribed ranges. 18' The Court was quick to say
that even if the presumption encouraged judges to impose within-
Guidelines sentences, it would not make the Guidelines unconstitutional
under Booker, but it would further Congress's goal of diminishing
unwarranted sentencing disparity. ' 82
4. Appellate Review of a Sentence Outside the Guidelines: Gall v. United
States and Kimbrough v. United States
In Gall v. United States, the defendant entered into a plea agreement
regarding his involvement in a drug conspiracy. 183  Specifically, the
defendant stipulated that he was responsible for possessing at least 2500
172. Generally, a probation officer must conduct a presentence investigation and submit a
presentence report to the court before the court sentences the defendant. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.1 (2008). For more information on presentence
reports and sentencing procedures in general, see id. § 6A.
173. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2461.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2462.
176. Id. U.S. courts of appeals are split as to the use of a presumption of reasonableness
for within-Guidelines sentences. See id. (collecting cases).
177. Id.
178. See id. at 2463. The Court explained that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) commands the
sentencing judge to consider a multitude of factors, including the Sentencing Guidelines, and
that 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) tells the Sentencing Commission to write the Guidelines toward the
same objectives in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Id. "The upshot is that the sentencing statutes
envision both the sentencing judge and the Commission as carrying out the same basic §
3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other at wholesale." Id.
179. Id. at 2465.
180. Id. at 2466.
181. Id. at2467.
182. See id.
183. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 592 (2007).
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grams of ecstasy, but did not necessarily distribute it. 184 In return, the
government acknowledged that the defendant had withdrawn from the
conspiracy before law enforcement officials caught him. 185  The
presentence report recommended a punishment of thirty to thirty-seven
months in prison.186 However, the judge imposed a sentence of only thirty-
six months of probation. 187  The district court supported the lenient
sentence by citing factors such as the defendant's withdrawal from the
conspiracy, socially beneficial postoffense conduct, and compliance with
pretrial release.1 88
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's departure from the Guidelines. 189 The circuit court characterized
the departure as "'a 100% downward variance"' because it eliminated all
prison time. 190 The court then held that there were no extraordinary
circumstances present in the case to support such an extraordinary departure
from the Guidelines. 191
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court's departure
from the Guidelines was reasonable. 192 In its opinion, the Court also
clarified the sentencing and appellate review processes. A district court
must first calculate the sentence according to the Sentencing Guidelines and
then hear from the parties before considering whether the sentence is
appropriate in light of the other statutory factors in § 3553(a). 193 The
sentencing judge-as opposed to an appellate judge' 94-- may not presume
the Sentencing Guidelines range to be reasonable. 195 The judge must find
sufficiently compelling evidence before deciding to depart from the
Guidelines. 196 Finally, the judge must explain the reasoning for the
sentence "to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the
perception of fair sentencing."' 97
The Supreme Court then held that appellate courts must review sentences
for an abuse of discretion, but distinguished between procedural and
substantive appellate review. 198 First, the appellate court must ensure that
184. Id.
185. Id. The sentencing court did not use the Guidelines in effect on the date of
sentencing, but that was by agreement, not court order. Id.
186. Id. at 593.
187. Id.
188. Defendant's Gall's Sentencing Memorandum at 7-13, United States v. Gall, 374 F.
Supp. 2d 758 (S.D. Iowa 2005) (No. 4:04-CR-1 16).
189. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594.
190. Id. (quoting United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006)).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 602.
193. Id. at 596. For the list of statutory factors, see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying
text.
194. See id. at 597.
195. Id. at 596-97.
196. Id. ("We find it uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a
more significant justification than a minor one.").
197. Id.
198. See id.; supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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the district court did not make any procedural errors such as improperly
calculating or not calculating the Guidelines' sentencing range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, 199 basing
a sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to explain deviations from
the Guidelines. 200  When reviewing a sentence for substantive
reasonableness, the appellate court should take the totality of the
circumstances into account. 201 An appellate court may apply a presumption
of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence, but may not assume that
a sentence falling outside the Guidelines' range is unreasonable. 202 The
appellate court may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due
deference to the district court's explanation based on the § 3553(a)
factors. 203
In the case of the defendant in Gall, the Court specifically rejected
requiring a sentencing judge to justify a sentencing departure with
exceptional circumstances or mathematically proportionally compelling
evidence because these practices would be inconsistent with an abuse-of-
discretion standard of review. 204 The Court then held that the district court
did not commit any significant procedural error.205 The Court also held
that, substantively, the district court did not abuse its discretion even though
it weighed one of the § 3553(a) factors more heavily than the others.20 6
In Kimbrough v. United States, the defendant pled guilty to drug charges
including conspiracy to distribute crack and powder cocaine, possession
with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, and
possession with intent to distribute powder cocaine. 207 The U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined the defendant's
sentence under the Guidelines to be 228-270 months in prison. 20 8
However, the court sentenced the defendant to only 180 months in prison
plus five years of supervised release.209 The court reasoned that a sentence
in the Guidelines' range "would have been 'greater than necessary' to
accomplish the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). '210
In particular, the district court noted that, if the defendant had been
accountable for an equivalent amount of powder cocaine instead of crack,
the defendant's sentence under the Guidelines would have only been
199. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.




204. See id. at 596 ("This is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion
standard of review applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions-whether inside or
outside the Guidelines range.").
205. Id. at 598.
206. See id. at 602 ("The District Court quite reasonably attached great weight to Gall's
self-motivated rehabilitation .... ).
207. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007).
208. Id. at 565.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting the district court's order).
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97-106 months plus the five years of supervised release. 211 The district
court decided to impose the below-Guidelines sentence because of the
disproportionate and unjust sentencing differential between crack and
powder cocaine offenses. 212
The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence, reasoning that a sentence
outside the Guidelines range is per se unreasonable when based on a
disagreement with the sentencing disparity between crack and powder
cocaine offenses. 213 The sentencing disparity originated with the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986.214 This Act mandated a five-year minimum sentence
for defendants accountable for five grams of crack or five hundred grams of
powder.215 This Act also mandated a ten-year minimum sentence for those
accountable for fifty grams of crack or five thousand grams of powder.
216
Congress originally believed that crack was more dangerous than powder
cocaine, and thus treated one gram of crack equal to one hundred grams of
powder cocaine for sentencing purposes.217 In formulating the Guidelines
regarding cocaine sentencing, the Commission adopted this ratio-based
approach, 218 departing from its basic empirical approach.219 The ratio was
not one hundred-to-one at the time the Supreme Court decided Kimbrough
due to amendments by the Commission, 220 but varied between twenty-five-




214. Id. at 566. See generally Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100
Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
215. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 567.
216. Id.
217. See id. For more background information on the crack/powder cocaine sentencing
disparity and reform efforts, see generally THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FEDERAL CRACK
COCAINE SENTENCING (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/
Documents/publications/dp.cracksentencing.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1995) [hereinafter
1995 COCAINE REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/crack/exec.htm.
218. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 567.
219. See id. See generally supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
220. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 569. The Commission had unsuccessfully tried several
times to lower the one hundred-to-one ratio because it found that such a large ratio was
unwarranted. See id. at 568-69 (citing Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United
States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,074, 25,075-77 (May 10, 1995)). The Sentencing
Commission has also opposed the cocaine sentencing disparity in reports to Congress. See,
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 6-9 (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/rcongress/cocaine
2007.pdf, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 103-04 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r-Congress/02
crack/2002crackrpt.pdf; 1995 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 217, ch. 8, pt. D. In 2007, the
Commission succeeded in reducing the base offense level associated with each quantity of
crack by two, resulting in the range of ratios. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 569 (citing
Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28,558,
28,571-72 (May 21, 2007)).
221. See Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 573.
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The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision, holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing its sentence. 222
The Court stated that the district court properly cited factors in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) relevant to its departure from the Guidelines. 223 Further, the Court
noted that the district court properly relied on the Commission's stance that
the crack/powder disparity in the Guidelines does not embody the factors in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 224 In particular, the Court observed that, "as a general
matter, 'courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy
considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.' ' 225 Thus the
district court's sentence was reasonable. 226
5. Sentencing in the Lower Courts After Gall and Kimbrough
Gall and Kimbrough, both decided on December 10, 2007,227 were the
last Supreme Court cases to address the general standard of review for
departures from the Sentencing Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission
has been collecting district court sentencing statistics since these
decisions. 228 In 60,317 cases that district courts have decided since Gall
and Kimbrough,229 the prosecution sponsored 15,254 sentences below the
range that the Guidelines recommended. 230 The Sentencing Commission
counts these cases as conforming to the Guidelines. 231  However, for
purposes of this Note, it makes little sense to include these prosecution-
sponsored cases in the data sample because this Note is looking solely at
instances of judicial discretion. If the government asks for a below-range
222. See id. at 576.
223. See id. at 575 (citing the nature and circumstances of the crimes, as well as the
defendant's history and characteristics).
224. See id. at 576; see also supra note 220 (discussing the Commission's opposition to
the crack/powder disparity).
225. See id. at 570 (citing Brief for the United States at 16, Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. 558
(No. 06-6330)).
226. See id. at 575.
227. See id. at 558; Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 586 (2007).
228. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, POST-KIMBROUGHIGALL DATA REPORT (2008)
[hereinafter GALL REPORT II], available at http://www.ussc.gov/USSC-Kimbrough-Gall-
ReportFinalFY2008.pdf.
229. See id. tbl. 1. The time period for this data is from December 10, 2007, through
September 30, 2008. See id. tbl. 1 n. 1.
230. See id. tbl.1 & n.6. Prosecution-sponsored departures originate from 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e), which states that, "[u]pon motion of the Government, the court shall have the
authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so
as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1 (2008) ("Upon motion of the government stating
that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.").
For more background and the argument that these provisions vest too much power in the
executive branch of the government, see generally Buescher, supra note 56.
231. See Dillon, supra note 56, at 1090 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT
ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES v. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 57 (2006) [hereinafter
BOoKER REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report/BookerReport.pdf).
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sentence based on provisions in the Guidelines, it is not accurate to
characterize the result as a purely judicial choice. Thus, for the purposes of
this Note, the total number of sentencing decisions after Gall and
Kimbrough is 45,063. Of these, 35,732, or 79.3%, were within the
Guidelines' recommended range.232  There have been 981, or 2.2%,
sentences above the recommended range.233 There have been 8350, or
18.5%, sentences below the recommended range. 234 Table 1 displays this
data for the district courts in each circuit. For comparison, Table 2 displays
the same data, but includes the prosecution-sponsored below-Guidelines
sentences as within-Guidelines sentences.
Table 1: District Court Sentencing Data235
Total Sentences Sentences Sentences
Circuit Cases Within Above Below(12/10/07- Guidelines Guidelines Guidelines
09/30/08) # % # % # %
D.C. 184 123 66.8% 2 1.1% 59 32.1%
1st 1184 876 74.0% 23 1.9% 285 24.1%
2nd 2711 1634 60.3% 24 0.9% 1053 38.8%
3rd 1912 1370 71.7% 40 2.1% 502 26.3%
4th 4201 3403 81.0% 117 2.8% 681 16.2%
5th 11,250 9936 88.3% 269 2.4% 1045 9.3%
6th 3100 2304 74.3% 69 2.2% 727 23.5%
7th 1907 1300 68.2% 40 2.1% 567 29.7%
8th 3633 2852 78.5% 84 2.3% 697 19.2%
9th 6540 5052 77.2% 141 2.2% 1347 20.6%
10th 3618 2945 81.4% 79 2.2% 594 16.4%
1 1th 4823 3937 81.6% 93 1.9% 793 16.4%
TOTAL 45,063 35,732 79.3% 981 2.2% 8350 18.5%
Although Tables 1 and 2 capture sentencing results at the district court
level, they only present part of the picture. Statistics regarding appellate
affirmation and denial rates for sentences inside and outside the Guidelines'
recommended range are also relevant to determining the extent of district
court sentencing discretion. However, to date, there is no such statistical
compilation of sentencing data since Gall and Kimbrough, the relevant time
232. See GALL REPORT II, supra note 228, tbl. 1.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id. tbl.l-DC to tbl.I-1 1. Note that the percentages will not be the same as those
in the source because the prosecution-initiated below-range sentences have been removed
from the data sample.
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period for this Note. The New York Council of Defense Lawyers examined
appellate decisions reviewing sentencing decisions for unreasonableness,
but the cases are from January 1, 2006, to November 16, 2006-after
Booker, but before Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough,236 and thus irrelevant to the
issue in this Note. Nevertheless, examining individual appellate decisions
since Gall and Kimbrough provides detailed insight into a court's reasoning
as applied to a particular defendant. Statistics cannot--or at least cannot
yet---capture all of the individualized factors a judge must consider under §
3553(a). 237
Table 2: District Court Sentencing Data Including Government-Sponsored
Below-Guidelines Sentences238
Total Sentences Sentences Sentences
Circuit Cases Within Above Below(12/10/07- Guidelines Guidelines Guidelines
09/30/08) # % # % # %
D.C. 324 263 81.2% 2 0.6% 59 18.2%
1st 1421 1113 78.3% 23 1.6% 285 20.1%
2nd 3615 2538 70.2% 24 0.7% 1053 29.1%
3rd 2586 2044 79.0% 40 1.5% 502 19.4%
4th 5188 4390 84.6% 117 2.3% 681 13.1%
5th 14,125 12,811 90.7% 269 1.9% 1045 7.4%
6th 4303 3507 81.5% 69 1.6% 727 16.9%
7th 2436 1829 75.1% 40 1.6% 567 23.3%
8th 4468 3687 82.5% 84 1.9% 697 15.6%
9th 11,288 9800 86.8% 141 1.2% 1347 11.9%
10th 4767 4094 85.9% 79 1.7% 594 12.5%
1 1th 5796 4910 84.7% 93 1.6% 793 13.7%
TOTAL 60,317 50,986 84.5% 981 1.6% 8350 13.8%
236. Appendix to Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at la, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (No. 06-5754)
[hereinafter NYCDL Report]. This study found 1515 cases total. Id. at 2a. Circuit courts
vacated only 7 out of 154 above-Guidelines sentences that defendants appealed. Id. In
contrast, circuit courts vacated 60 out of 71 below-Guidelines sentences that the government
appealed. Id. The New York Council of Defense Lawyers conducted a similar study of
Eighth Circuit cases as part of an amicus brief for Gall v. United States, with comparably
one-sided results. See Appendix to Brief for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at ]a, Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007)
(No. 06-7949). This study compiled cases from January 1, 2006, through June 30, 2007, id.,
a time period before Gall and Kimbrough v. United States.
237. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
238. See GALL REPORT II, supra note 228, tbl. 1-DC to tbl. 1-11.
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Many circuits have affirmed sentences below the Guidelines' range on
the grounds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in the
departure. For instance, in United States v. Gardellini,239 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a sentence of five years
of probation and a $15,000 fine for an income tax violation.240 The
Sentencing Guidelines suggested a punishment of ten to sixteen months in
prison.24 The D.C. Circuit stated that the "Guidelines now are advisory
only, and substantive appellate review in sentencing cases is narrow and
deferential. ' 242 As such, the court said that it would be "unusual" to
reverse a district court's sentence, 243 citing many other circuits that have
ruled this way.244 The court noted that this sentencing regime would
undoubtedly lead to unpredictability, but that it is not the role of the courts
"to preserve quasi-mandatory Guidelines." 245 Citing Booker, the court said
that Congress could pass a new law making the Guidelines mandatory as
239. 545 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
240. Id. at 1091. The circuit court observed that the district court, when analyzing the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), emphasized the defendant's cooperation with authorities, low
risk of recidivism, depression, and the belief that a harsher sentence would not produce much
deterrence for tax evaders. See id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1090.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 1094 n.5 (citing cases from all circuits except the Second Circuit); see also
United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 128, 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming, in light of Gall, a
downward variance based on sentencing judge's reasoning); United States v. Austad, 519
F.3d 431, 433-36 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming, based on the district court's reliance on the
defendant's postoffense threat and violent history, an eighty-four month prison sentence
when the Guidelines specified a range of thirty-six to forty-six months for mailing
threatening communications); United States v. Marshall, 259 F. App'x 855, 863 (7th Cir.
2008) (affirming a below-Guidelines sentence based on the district court's concern about the
defendant's age and family); United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 746-47, 754 (7th
Cir. 2007) (affirming a downward variance based on the sentencing judge's positive opinion
of the defendant's personal characteristics and low risk of recidivism); Panel Discussion,
supra note 1, at 12 (Judge Presnell noting, "the Eleventh Circuit has confirmed several
below-Guidelines sentences, including one of mine"). In a huge departure from the
Guidelines, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed--based on Gall and
the district court's careful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors-a sentence of forty-two
months in prison for securities fraud and related violations when the Guidelines called for
life in prison. See United States v. Adelson, Nos. 06-2738-cr, 06-3179, 2008 WL 5155341,
at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 9, 2008). The court also ordered $50 million in restitution to the
shareholders and forfeiture of $1.2 million in criminal proceeds. Id. United States v. Adelson
certainly sets a high bar in the Second Circuit for overturning a sentence on substantive
reasonableness review. But cf United States v. Cutler, 520 F.3d 136, 176 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding a lesser downward departure substantively unreasonable).
245. Gardellini, 545 F.3d at 1096; cf United States v. Pickett, 475 F.3d 1347, 1353 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) ("A sentencing judge cannot simply presume that a Guidelines sentence is the
correct sentence. To do so would be to take a large step in the direction of returning to the
pre-Booker regime." (citing United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3055 (2007)); United States v. Brown, 450 F.3d 76, 81-82
(1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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long as the jury finds all of the facts used to increase a defendant's base
offense level. 246
Circuit courts have also overturned district courts' sentences as
unreasonable.247  In United States v. Cutler,248 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit overturned the sentence of the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York as procedurally unreasonable. 249 The
district court had sentenced the defendant to 366 days in prison for bank
fraud and related crimes.2 50 The Sentencing Guidelines called for seventy-
eight to ninety-seven months.251  The Second Circuit dismissed the
sentence because of the district court's procedural errors, factual errors, and
misinterpretation of the § 3553(a) factors. 252
In United States v. Abu Ali,253 the Fourth Circuit found a sentence of the
Eastern District of Virginia substantively unreasonable because the
deviation from the Guidelines was just too large given the circumstances of
the offense. 254 The district court had sentenced the defendant to thirty years
246. Gardellini, 545 F.3d at 1096 (citing Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 603 (2007)
(Souter, J., concurring); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005)).
247. See generally Stith, supra note 2, at 1420 (concluding that, even though there is
more sentencing discretion after Booker, it is not at the level of the pre-Guidelines era).
248. 520 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2008).
249. See id. at 176. The majority held that the sentence was substantively unreasonable
as well. See id. In concurrence, Judge Rosemary Pooler noted that an appellate court should
not reach the question of substantive reasonableness until the district court has remedied the
procedural errors. See id. (Pooler, J., concurring).
250. Seeid. at 139-40.
251. See id.
252. Id. at 176.
253. 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008).
254. See id. at 269; see also United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1182, 1191, 1200-01
(1 1th Cir. 2008) (holding that a sentence of probation for child pornography offenses, when
the Guidelines' range was 97-120 months in prison, was substantively unreasonable because
the district court did not sufficiently justify the deviation); United States v. Goldberg, 491
F.3d 668, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding as unreasonable a sentence of one day in prison
for possessing child pornography when the Guidelines recommended forty-six to fifty-seven
months in prison). But see United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2008)
(per curiam) (using abuse-of-discretion review to affirm a sentence of probation when the
Guidelines called for forty-one to fifty-one months in prison for copyright-related crimes).
For other examples of unreasonable sentences in the Seventh Circuit, see United States v.
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 751-53 (7th Cir. 2007). As an aside, a William and Mary Law
Review Note by David C. Holman argues that substantive reasonableness review contributes
to the ongoing unconstitutionality of the Guidelines. See David C. Holman, Note, Death by a
Thousand Cases: After Booker, Rita, and Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth
Amendment, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 302-03 (2008). That is, this form of appellate
review helps to strip district courts of their discretion, and thus the Guidelines are not
advisory. See id. at 309. Note that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has recently cited to Holman's Note with approval, so presumably this court would
choose to engage only in procedural reasonableness review. United States v. Gardellini, 545
F.3d 1089, 1094 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2008). While Holman's argument is contrary to the
conclusion of this Note that sentencing judges do have sufficient discretion, he does
advocate making the Guidelines truly advisory-and thus constitutional--by abolishing




in prison for planning to commit terrorist acts in the United States. 255 The
Sentencing Guidelines called for life in prison.256
In Booker the Supreme Court modified the Sentencing Guidelines to be
advisory but subject to mandatory review for reasonableness. Two years
later, the Court emphasized that the Guidelines were advisory in Gall and
Kimbrough, but also explicitly commanded appellate courts to review
sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion, both procedurally and
substantively. As this subsection discussed, appellate courts have recently
been showing more deference to district court sentencing decisions,
although still sometimes overturning sentences for substantive
unreasonableness. The next part of this Note discusses this same tension
between advisory Guidelines and mandatory appellate review in a different
context: whether the Guidelines are mandatory enough to be "laws"
pursuant to the Ex Post Facto Clause.
II. THE SPLIT: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE TO
THE GUIDELINES AFTER BOOKER
Parts L.A and I.B of this Note laid out the Supreme Court's Ex Post Facto
Clause jurisprudence and the history and operation of the Sentencing
Guidelines. Part .C then discussed the effect of the Ex Post Facto Clause
on "mandatory" Guidelines. Finally, Part I.D explained how the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee to a jury trial led the Supreme Court to render the
Guidelines "advisory," but still subject to appellate review. Part II of this
Note discusses an emerging conflict among U.S. courts of appeals and
commentators: whether the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits a district court
from increasing a criminal defendant's sentence by using the version of the
Sentencing Guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing rather than on the
date of the defendant's offense, even though the Guidelines are "advisory"
after Booker. Parts II.A and I.B examine this split among U.S. courts of
appeals.257 Part II.B also presents commentators' criticisms of holding that
the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the Guidelines.
255. SeeAbuAli, 528 F.3d at 221.
256. See id. at 258.
257. A few circuits have not yet addressed this issue. See United States v. Shira, 286 F.
App'x 650, 652-53 (1 lth Cir. 2008) (noting the split but declining to address the issue);
United States v. Jones, 254 F. App'x 711, 730 (10th Cir. 2007) (declining to address the
issue but looking to the Guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing in determining the
reasonableness of a sentence); United States v. Stevens, 462 F.3d 1169, 1170 (9th Cir. 2006)
(applying the Ex Post Facto Clause to the Guidelines without analyzing the effect of
Booker). Note that this issue is distinct from ex post facto concerns of the Due Process
Clause, see generally Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001), when applying Booker
retroactively rather than the Guidelines, see United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 446 (6th
Cir. 2008) (recognizing the difference as addressed in United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649
(6th Cir. 2006)). Many circuits have held that retroactively applying Booker in this manner
presents no ex post facto problem. See, e.g., United States v. Fairclough, 439 F.3d 76, 78-79
(2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Austin, 432 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam);
United States v. Cross, 430 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2005). But see United States v. Rodarte-
Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (declining to apply Booker retroactively).
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A. The Ex Post Facto Clause Does Not Apply to the Sentencing Guidelines
This section examines the point of view that the Guidelines are advisory,
not "laws," and thus the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to them. Part
II.A. 1 explores the recent Demaree decision, in which the Seventh Circuit
became the first and only circuit court to adopt this position thus far.258
Part II.A.2 then discusses a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit that may indicate agreement with the Seventh Circuit in the
future.
1. The Seventh Circuit: United States v. Demaree
In Demaree, the defendant pled guilty to wire fraud and tax offenses.259
The version of the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offenses specified
a sentencing range of eighteen to twenty-four months. 260 The version in
effect at the time of sentencing specified a range of twenty-seven to thirty-
three months. 26 1 The judge used the later version to sentence the defendant
to thirty months. 2 62 However, he stated that, if the earlier Guidelines
applied, he would have imposed a sentence of twenty-seven months. 263
The only issue on appeal was whether the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibited
the application of the postoffense Guidelines to increase the defendant's
sentence.
264
The Seventh Circuit held that the sentencing judge could use the later
Guidelines, as the Ex Post Facto Clause "should apply only to laws and
regulations that bind rather than advise." 265  The Seventh Circuit
distinguished the post-Booker Sentencing Guidelines from those at issue in
Miller by pointing out that, in Miller, the sentencing judge had to set forth
clear and convincing evidence to depart from the presumptive guideline
range. 266 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that after Booker, a federal judge
need only consult the Sentencing Guidelines and is subject to only "light
258. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 792 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
3055 (2007). At least one district court in the Fourth Circuit agrees with the United States v.
Demaree decision. See Hill v. Driver, No. 5:08CV96, 2009 WL 130217, at *4 (N.D. W. Va.
Jan. 14, 2009).
259. Dernaree, 459 F.3d at 792.
260. Id. The Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense were the 2000 version. Id.
261. Id. The Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing were the 2004 version. Id. The
issue of whether an appellate court may retroactively apply the Booker decision is beyond
the scope of this Note. This was not the issue on appeal in Demaree.
262. Id. The Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) states that the sentencing judge should
consider the version of the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii) (2006).
263. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 792-93.
264. Id. at 792.
265. Id. at 795. See generally Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com
/sentencinglawand-policy/2006/08/seventh circuit_ .html (Aug. 11, 2006, 13:05 EDT).
266. See Demaree, 459 F.3d at 794; see also supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text




appellate review." 267 Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines were not mandatory
and the Ex Post Facto Clause did not control them.26 8 The Seventh Circuit
also declared that its holding was consistent with the Supreme Court's tests
of an ex post facto law in Garner and Morales.269
Further, the Seventh Circuit explained that a rule prohibiting a judge
from using the later version of the Guidelines to impose a harsher sentence
would be futile. 270 The judge could just say that he departed from the
earlier version of the Guidelines based on the factors in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). 27 1 The judge could reason that in adhering to these factors, he
looked to the information in the later version of the Guidelines. 272 An
appellate court could not say that such a judge had acted unreasonably if his
sentence fell within the recommended range of the most current version of
the Guidelines. 273 So far, the Seventh Circuit is alone in its position that the
Ex Post Facto Clause applies to the Guidelines, but as the next subsection
of this Note discusses, the Fifth Circuit may not be far behind.
2. The Fifth Circuit: United States v. Rodarte- Vasquez
In United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez,274 the Fifth Circuit indicated that it
might agree with the Seventh Circuit in future cases where the defendant
committed the offense after Booker.275 In Rodarte- Vasquez, the defendant
pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation.2 76 The presentence report
used the 2003 version of the Guidelines, which recommended a sixteen-
level enhancement because the defendant was deported for an alien
smuggling felony.2 77  The 2002 Sentencing Guidelines limited this
enhancement to alien smuggling felonies committed for profit.278 Using the
2003 Guidelines, the judge sentenced the defendant to forty-six months in
prison. 279 The defendant objected to his sentence, arguing that the use of
the 2003 Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because he
committed the illegal reentry when the 2002 Guidelines were in effect.2 80
267. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 794.




274. 488 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2007).
275. See id. at 318, 323 (deciding the case under a pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines
regime because sentencing occurred prior to Booker); id. at 323 (Jones, C.J., concurring)
(indicating that, after Booker, the Ex Post Facto Clause does not control the Guidelines
because they are advisory). In Demaree, the defendant was sentenced prior to Booker.
Compare Demaree, 459 F.3d at 792 (sentencing defendant pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines),
with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (deciding case on January 12, 2005).
276. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d at 318.
277. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2LI.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2003)).
278. Id. at 319.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 322.
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In her concurring opinion, Chief Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit
stated that "[p]ost-Booker, the [G]uidelines are informative, not
mandatory." 281 Thus, according to Chief Judge Jones, the Ex Post Facto
Clause does not bar a judge from using the Guidelines in effect at the time
of sentencing to increase the defendant's sentence. 282 The majority did not
apply Judge Jones's reasoning because the sentencing took place prior to
Booker.283 The majority decided to review the defendant's appeal "under
the pre-Booker mandatory guidelines regime." 284 Under this condition, the
majority held that the application of the later version of the Guidelines
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 285 While the Fifth Circuit has indicated
that it may later agree with the Seventh Circuit that the Ex Post Facto
Clause does not control the Sentencing Guidelines because they are
advisory, this is not the case in the majority of other circuit courts to
consider the issue. The next part of this Note discusses the opposition of
these courts of appeals.
B. The Ex Post Facto Clause Applies to the Sentencing Guidelines
Part II.A explored the view, led by the Seventh Circuit in Demaree, that
the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines
because the Guidelines are advisory after Booker. Part II.B discusses the
opposite side of the argument--that the Guidelines are still effectively
mandatory despite Booker and therefore are "laws" under the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Thus, a district court may not use the version of the Guidelines in
effect on the day of sentencing if doing so would result in a harsher penalty
than using the version in effect on the day of the offense. Part II.B.5
discusses a West Virginia Law Review article that uses the Supreme Court
precedent in Garner and Morales to support this view.
1. The Eighth Circuit: United States v. Carter
Outside the Seventh and Fifth Circuits, courts vary in their degree of
opposition to the holding in Demaree. In United States v. Carter,286 the
Eighth Circuit bluntly declined to follow the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Demaree.287 In Carter, the U.S. District Court for the District of South
281. Id. at 325 (Jones, C.J., concurring). But cf United States v. Austin, 479 F.3d 363,
367 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[T]o avoid ex post facto concerns, the court uses the Guidelines
yielding the lesser penalty."). Note that the court in United States v. Austin did not actually
hold that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to the Guidelines; it merely declined to address
the issue. See id.
282. See Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d at 325.
283. See id.
284. Id. at 323 (Barksdale, J.).
285. Id. at 324.
286. 490 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 2007).
287. See id. at 643 (citing United States v. Larrabee, 436 F.3d 890, 894 (8th Cir. 2006)).
However, in United States v. Larrabee, the circuit court took postoffense amendments of the
Guidelines into account when affirming the reasonableness of a sentence that exceeded the
recommended range set forth in the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense. See
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Dakota sentenced the defendant to 295 months in prison for sexual abuse of
a minor and related crimes. 288 The defendant appealed, arguing that the
court violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by applying a sentencing
enhancement under § 4B1.5(b)(1) of the Guidelines for repeat sexual
offenders. 289 This section went into effect November 1, 2001, after the
defendant committed the offense. 290
The Eighth Circuit first stated that the retrospective application of the
Sentencing Guidelines implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause.291 The court
referred to § lB 1.11 of the Guidelines, which directs a court to apply the
version in effect at the date of sentencing unless doing so violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause. 292 However, the court did not reach the defendant's ex
post facto claim, affirming his sentence based on a procedural issue.293
2. The Sixth Circuit: United States v. Duane
In United States v. Duane,294 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit similarly opposed the holding in Demaree.295  In Duane, the
defendant pled guilty to various child pornography charges.296  The
presentence report calculated a punishment range of 97-121 months in
prison based on the 2005 version of the Guidelines.297 The defendant
objected to this range, arguing that the use of the 2005 Guidelines violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause because he committed some of the offenses before
Larrabee, 436 F.3d at 891-92; see also United States v. Jones, 254 F. App'x 711, 730-31
(10th Cir. 2007) (taking postoffense Guidelines into account during reasonableness review).
The court in United States v. Jones did not rule on whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applied
to the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 730.
288. Carter, 490 F.3d at 643.
289. See id. at 644.
290. See id. This case was complicated because it involved the "one-book" rule, which
instructs the court to apply the version of the Guidelines in effect for the last of multiple
offenses to all of the offenses, even if that version would not apply to all the offenses
separately. See id. at 643-44 (citation omitted). This Note does not discuss the applicability
of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the one-book rule, but United States v. Carter necessarily
addressed the applicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the Guidelines. For more
information on the one-book rule and a discussion of its unconstitutionality before Booker,
see William P. Ferranti, Comment, Revised Sentencing Guidelines and the Ex Post Facto
Clause, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1011 (2003).
291. See Carter, 490 F.3d at 643; supra note 287 and accompanying text.
292. Carter, 490 F.3d at 643. However, the Sentencing Commission added section
IB 1.11 in response to the holding in Miller that the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. See supra notes 112-16. This history suggests that any
Ex Post Facto Clause inquiry should remain independent from this section. This section
only commands that the court use the Guidelines in effect at sentencing unless the court
independently finds an ex post facto violation.
293. Carter, 490 F.3d at 645-46 ("We conclude that [the defendant] has forfeited his
current expostfacto claim, and thus we decline to address it on the merits.").
294. 533 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2008).
295. See id. at 446 & n.1, 447.
296. See id. at 443.
297. Id.
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that version took effect. 298 At the sentencing hearing, the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Kentucky relied on Sixth Circuit precedent
to hold that the Sentencing Guidelines did not implicate the Ex Post Facto
Clause because the Guidelines were advisory.299 Thus the court overruled
the defendant's objection to using the 2005 Guidelines. 30 0
The Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling below, denying that its precedent
announced such a rule. 30 1 The court cited other Sixth Circuit precedent
holding that the retroactive application of the Sentencing Guidelines would
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if doing so resulted in a harsher
sentence. 30 2 The court reasoned that, under Garner, the Guidelines qualify
as ex post facto laws because they affect a judge's discretion. 30 3
3. The D.C. Circuit: United States v. Turner
In United States v. Turner,30 4 the D.C. Circuit recently rejected the
decision in Demaree.30 5 In Turner, a jury found the defendant guilty of
conspiracy to commit bribery and to defraud the United States. 306 The
defendant had received the money from his crime in 2001. 3o7 The version
of the Guidelines in effect at this time specified twenty-one to twenty-seven
months in prison. 30 8 In 2004, an amendment to the Guidelines increased
the punishment to thirty-three to forty-one months in prison. 30 9 In 2007, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia used the version in effect at
sentencing, unchanged from 2004, to sentence the defendant to thirty-three
months in prison. 3 10
On appeal, the defendant argued that the use of the postoffense
Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it imposed a harsher
penalty than the preoffense version for a crime he committed in 2001.311
The government argued that the conspiracy ended in 2005 based on acts to
298. See id. at 444-45. This case also involved the "one-book" rule. See id. at 447. See
generally supra note 290.
299. See Duane, 533 F.3d at 444 (citing United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649, 655 n.4
(6th Cir. 2006)).
300. See id.
301. See id. at 446 ("Although we recognize that some language from... Barton...
could be read to suggest that a change to the Guidelines does not raise an ex post facto
concern, we decline to read Barton as announcing such a broad rule.").
302. See id. at 447 (citing United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 572-73 (6th Cir. 2008)).
303. See id. (citing Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372, 382 (6th Cir. 2007)).
304. 548 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
305. See id. at 1096. For more commentary on United States v. Turner, see Sentencing
Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/2008/12/dc-
circuit-produces-crisp-split-on-ex-post-issues-after-booker-finally.html (Dec. 5, 2008, 11:26
EST).
306. Turner, 548 F.3d at 1096.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1096 & n.l (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1 (2004)).




conceal the initial crime, and thus the lower court properly applied the
harsher sentencing range because that was the range in effect when the
defendant's crime ended.312 The D.C. Circuit agreed with the defendant,
first holding that the conspiracy ended in 2001 because the acts to conceal
the initial crime were not part of the conspiracy.313 The court then held
that, under Garner and Miller, the use of the 2004 Guidelines violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause because it created a significant risk of increasing the
defendant's punishment from the 2001 Guidelines. 314 The D.C. Circuit
reasoned that the district court likely would have followed the earlier, more
lenient Guidelines had it used them, pointing out that it followed the later,
harsher Guidelines, but sentenced at the very bottom of the range.315
In the reasoning for its holding regarding the ex post facto violation, the
court rejected the Seventh Circuit's point in Demaree that sentencing
judges could circumvent a rule that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to the
Guidelines by looking to postoffense amendments to the Guidelines for the
reasonableness of a departure. 3 16 The D.C. Circuit stated that it did not
believe that district court judges would "misrepresent the true basis for their
actions." 317 The D.C. Circuit also rejected the Seventh Circuit's notion that
district court judges' discretion in sentencing is "unfettered. '318 The D.C.
Circuit said that district court judges would be more likely to follow the
Guidelines because of the holding in Rita that an appellate court may find a
within-Guidelines sentence presumptively reasonable. 319
312. See id.
313. See id. at 1098.
314. See id. at 1100.
315. See id. The D.C. Circuit did not explicitly state the inference, reasonable or not, that
the district court wanted to but did not impose a sentence less than the later Guidelines'
range.
316. See id. at 1099.
317. Id.
318. See id.
319. See id. The court in Turner suggested that Rita v. United States overruled the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Demaree regarding the presumption of reasonableness, see
Turner, 548 F.3d at 1099-100, but this suggestion is incorrect. The Turner court's rationale
suggests that the Demaree court said that an appellate judge may not apply the presumption
of reasonableness. See id. ("As to Demaree's first reason, the Supreme Court has since
confirmed that appellate courts may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court
sentence calculated in conformity with the Guidelines." (citing Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338 (2007); United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2006))). However,
the court in Demaree was clear that a sentencing judge--as opposed to an appellate
judge--may not apply a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence. See
United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
3055 (2007). ("The judge is not required-or indeed permitted-to 'presume' that a sentence
within the guidelines range is the correct sentence .... His choice of sentence, whether
inside or outside the guideline range, is discretionary .... " (citing United States v. Brown,
450 F.3d 76, 81-82 (1st Cir. 2006))). The Court in Rita reinforced this distinction. See
supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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4. The First Circuit: United States v. Gilman
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is less staunch in its
opposition to Demaree than the Sixth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits. In United
States v. Gilman,320 the defendant pled guilty to a violation of the
Investment Adviser's Act of 1940 and various counts of mail and wire
fraud. 321  The 2005 Guidelines recommended a sentence of 188-235
months in prison. 32 2 The defendant appealed, arguing that only one offense
occurred after this version of the Guidelines took effect. 323 He objected to
the fact that the later version of the Guidelines provided a longer sentence
than the previous version for all of his other offenses. 324
The First Circuit noted the Seventh Circuit's decision in Demaree that
the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the Guidelines, but then said that
"the issue is doubtful in this circuit. '325 The court relied on an earlier First
Circuit case, United States v. Cruzado-Laureano,326 for this opposition. 327
However, the court in Cruzado-Laureano stated that the Ex Post Facto
Clause applied to the Guidelines without analyzing the effect of Booker.328
Thus, while the First Circuit clearly would apply the Ex Post Facto Clause
to the Sentencing Guidelines based on Gilman, precedential support from
First Circuit case law for such a position is simply not that strong.
5. James R. Dillon: Applying Garner and Morales
To date, the most thorough criticism of the holding in Demaree has come
from commentators instead of from the courts.3 29  James R. Dillon
confronts the ex post facto issue with the "advisory" Sentencing Guidelines
by applying the Supreme Court's precedent in Morales and Garner.330 As
discussed above, the test for whether an amended rule's retroactive
application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause after Morales and Garner is
two-pronged. First, the Ex Post Facto Clause will prohibit such an
application if the terms or words of the rule show that the defendant is at a
320. 478 F.3d 440 (1st Cir. 2007).
321. Id. at 443.
322. See id. at 444. Later in the case, the conflict seems to be between the 2003
Guidelines and an earlier version. See id. at 449. However, the punishment for the
defendant's crimes increased in the 2003 Guidelines and was the same in 2005. See id. at
449 n.3.
323. See id. at 449. Again, this case deals with the "one-book" rule. See generally supra
note 290.
324. See Gilman, 478 F.3d at 449.
325. Id.
326. 404 F.3d 470 (1st Cir. 2005) (decided three months after Booker).
327. See Gilman, 478 F.3d at 449.
328. See Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d at 488 n.10; see also United States v. Kingbury,
No. CR-05-51-B-W, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62779, at *9 (D. Me. Sept. 1, 2006) (rejecting
Demaree and following Cruzado-Laureano).
329. See generally Dillon, supra note 56; Christine M. Zeivel, Note, Ex-Post-Booker:
Retroactive Application of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 395 (2008).
330. See Dillon, supra note 56, at 1077-94.
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significant risk of more punishment under the postoffense rule than under
the preoffense rule. 331 Second, even if the rule allows for discretion in its
application, the defendant can also show an ex post facto violation by
presenting evidence from the rule's practical implementation that the
postoffense rule will result in a greater punishment than the preoffense
rule. 332
Dillon argues that after Booker, the "advisory" Guidelines still violate the
first prong of the Garner inquiry.333  Dillon argues that, because the
Supreme Court in Gall mandated that judges first calculate the appropriate
range using the Sentencing Guidelines, application of an upwardly revised
Guidelines range creates a substantial risk of increased punishment.
334
Dillon also doubts that allowing appellate courts to require more significant
reasoning for larger departures from the Guidelines would also limit the
discretion of sentencing judges.335
Dillon concludes further that empirical evidence of the implementation of
the Guidelines indicates that retrospective application of an upwardly
revised guideline, satisfying the second prong of the Garner test. 336 Dillon
argues that after repeated attempts by the Supreme Court to clarify the
sentencing and appellate review process, there is still a substantial rate of
compliance with the Sentencing Guidelines. 337 Dillon also points to the
high affirmation rate of within-guideline sentences, the high reversal rate of
below-guideline sentences, and the relatively lower reversal rate of above-
guideline sentences as additional evidence of a lack of sentencing
discretion. 338
To support his position, Dillon cites United States ex rel. Forman v.
McCall,339 in which the Third Circuit found that a compliance rate of
75.4% with the Adult Guidelines for Parole Decision Making of the U.S.
Parole Commission was insufficient to establish them as "laws" under the
Ex Post Facto Clause.340 Dillon argues that, because the rate of compliance
with the Sentencing Guidelines since Gall and Kimbrough, roughly 85%, is
331. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
333. See Dillon, supra note 56, at 1078-88.
334. See id. at 1088 ("[S]o long as the Sentencing Guidelines operate as a 'benchmark or
a point of reference or departure' that will exert 'appreciable influence' over the sentencing
court... the revision will continue to create a substantial risk of increased punishment, and
is therefore prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause." (quoting United States v. Rubenstein,
403 F.3d 93, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2005))). See supra notes 192-203 and accompanying text for
the Supreme Court's enumerated procedure in Gall.
335. See Dillon, supra note 56, at 1087-88. In Gall, the Supreme Court said that judges
should support large departures from the Guidelines with more significant reasoning, but
rejected a requirement for a strict mathematical correlation between the reasons and extent of
the departure. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
336. See Dillon, supra note 56, at 1089-94.
337. See id. at 1090.
338. See id. at 1091-92 (citing NYCDL Report, supra note 236).
339. 776 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1985).
340. See Dillon, supra note 56, at 1090-91 (citing Forman, 776 F.2d at 1163).
2009] 2657
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
so much higher than 75.4%, the Sentencing Guidelines are not advisory and
thus are subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. 341 In summary, Dillon argues
that empirical data shows that district courts lack sentencing discretion, the
only exception being an above-guideline departure. 342 Thus, a judge would
most likely follow the Guidelines. Dillon concludes that a judge's use of
the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing would violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause if the postoffense Guidelines specified a greater sentence than
the preoffense Guidelines. As Part II.B shows, Dillon's position on this
legal conflict-whether the Ex Post Facto Clause controls the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines-accords with nearly all U.S. courts of appeals that
have considered it. Part II.A discussed the only court of appeals, the
Seventh Circuit, that has firmly taken the other side. Part III of this Note
agrees with the Seventh Circuit, examining recent cases from all U.S. courts
of appeals that review sentencing decision quite leniently, strongly
suggesting that the Guidelines are no longer "laws" under the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
III. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE Ex POST FACTO CLAUSE TO THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The holding of the Seventh Circuit in Demaree--that the Ex Post Facto
Clause does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines--must stand for three
reasons. First, under Garner, the Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Booker and subsequent cases show that the
Guidelines are advisory on their face and in their practical implementation.
Thus, their retroactive application does not create a substantial risk of
increased punishment when there is an upward adjustment in a sentencing
range. Second, the available empirical data on which the Dillon article
relies could be misleading. Gall, Kimbrough, and recent appellate court
decisions affirming lenient sentences are much more solid evidence that
sentencing judges have actual discretion to depart from the Sentencing
Guidelines. Third, judges could easily circumvent a rule that the Ex Post
Facto Clause did apply to the Sentencing Guidelines.
A. The Sentencing Guidelines Under the Garner Inquiry
Under the first prong of the Garner test, the Ex Post Facto Clause does
not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines. This prong prohibits the retroactive
application of a "rule" that "by its own terms show[s] a significant risk" of
341. See id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY POST-KIMBROUGHGALL
DATA REPORT (2008) [hereinafter GALL REPORT I], available at http://www.ussc.gov/
USSCKimbroughGallReportFebruary_08.pdf). This Note uses a later version of this
report. See GALL REPORT II, supra note 228. The earlier version includes data only from
December 10, 2007, to February 21, 2008, but the percentages are substantially the same.
See GALL REPORT I, supra, tbl. 1 n. 1.
342. See Dillon, supra note 56, at 1091-92.
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an increased punishment. 343 Retroactive application of the Sentencing
Guidelines does not pose a significant risk of increased punishment because
they are advisory. In Booker, the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines
advisory to avoid violating the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial.344
If the Guidelines are considered "quasi-mandatory" and a district court
increased the defendant's sentence based on facts that the judge found, it
would compromise the defendant's right to a jury trial. 345 Further, in the
cases following Booker, the Supreme Court has clearly emphasized that the
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory.346 Calling the Sentencing Guidelines
"laws" for the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause and "advisory" to avoid
the Sixth Amendment's right to a trial by jury is simply contradictory.
The Sentencing Guidelines also fail to satisfy the second prong of the
Garner inquiry. The second prong of the Garner test says that an ex post
facto "law" is one where evidence of its practical implementation
demonstrates that its retroactive application will result in an increased
punishment.347 In both Gall and Kimbrough, the Supreme Court affirmed
sentences below the Guidelines' recommended range. 348 In Kimbrough
specifically, the sentencing judge squarely disagreed with the policy in the
Guidelines rather than relying on any one non-Guidelines factor in
§ 3553(a). 349 In Demaree, the Seventh Circuit announced its rule that the
Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply because sentencing judges have
essentially unfettered discretion. 350 There have also been many recent
cases from other circuits that allowed for sentencing discretion by affirming
below-Guidelines sentences.351 These cases show that the Guidelines are
advisory as long as the sentencing judge articulates sound reasoning for
343. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 245-46 and
accompanying text (discussing case in which D.C. Circuit stated that it is not the role of the
courts to preserve "quasi-mandatory" Guidelines). For a different point of view, see
generally Holman, supra note 254. Holman argued that the Guidelines are effectively
mandatory, but he advocated making the Guidelines truly "advisory" by eliminating
substantive reasonableness review because, otherwise, they would be unconstitutional under
Booker. See supra note 254. This is a parallel tension to the advisory/mandatory cx post
facto issue in this Note, which also argues that the "advisory" status should be maintained
because, otherwise, the Guidelines would be unconstitutional under Booker. Both Holman
and this Note agree that calling the Guidelines effectively mandatory is not the solution.
346. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 576-77 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (collecting quotes from Booker and subsequent cases). "These statements mean
that the district court is free to make its own reasonable application of the § 3553(a) factors,
and to reject (after due consideration) the advice of the Guidelines." Id. at 577.
347. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 192-206, 222-26 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text. It remains to be seen whether
Kimbrough stands for the broad proposition that district courts may reject a Guideline
sentence when they disagree with the policy behind it or the narrower proposition that a
court may reject the Guidelines only when the Sentencing Commission demonstrates a
disagreement with Congress over the policy rationale. See Stith, supra note 2, at 1492.
350. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
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departing from the Guidelines. 352 In particular, even if judges look to the
version of the Guidelines in effect at sentencing, they have real discretion to
impose a lenient sentence. This discretion mitigates the two concerns of the
Ex. Post Facto Clause-lack of fair notice and prevention of vindictive
legislation. 353 The defendant cannot complain of lack of notice because he
cannot show what his sentence would be under any version of the
Guidelines the court might use. Also, if the Sentencing Commission
vindictively raised a particular sentence, the judge has the power to
reasonably lower the sentence. 354
Further, the Ex Post Facto Clause should not apply to the Guidelines
because the Garner test only finds an ex post facto violation when there is a
significant risk of an increased punishment, 35 5 not any risk at all of an
increased punishment. This means that the Guidelines do not have to be
absolutely advisory, nor must sentencing judges wield absolute discretion
for the Guidelines to be free from the Ex Post Facto Clause. Sentencing
judges are allowed to exercise "reasonable" discretion, which has become
an abuse-of-discretion standard.356 As a result, the risk of an increased
punishment from a retroactive use of a harsher version of the Guidelines is
less likely to be "significant" and thus an Ex Post Facto Clause violation.
Dillon argues that forcing judges to first calculate the appropriate
sentence under the Guidelines satisfies the first prong of the Garner test.357
This argument is flawed because it takes one procedural mandate out of the
context of the whole sentencing process. 358 The district courts have clear
instructions to take other factors besides the Guidelines into account. 359
Also, the district court judge may not presume the Guidelines to be
reasonable.360  Sentencing judges may follow the Guidelines but, after
giving them due consideration, are not required to do so.361
B. Refuting Empirical Evidence
Dillon also argues that under the second prong in Garner, the Sentencing
Guidelines are "laws" based on empirical rates of compliance with the
Guidelines by sentencing judges as well as rates of affirmation and reversal
by appellate courts. 362 However, Dillon's reliance on empirical data is
352. See, e.g., supra note 346 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
354. It seems possible that a judge is equipped to make such a determination by
examining legislative history, the circumstances of a case, and other factors to determine if
vindictiveness toward a particular defendant exists.
355. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
358. Cf Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255 (2000) ("[T]he general operation of the...
system may produce relevant evidence and inform further analysis on the point.").
359. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 346.
362. See supra notes 336-41 and accompanying text.
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misplaced. He points to the high standard of compliance with the
Guidelines, the high affirmation rate of within-Guideline sentences, the
high reversal rate of below-Guidelines sentences, and the high affirmation
rate of above-Guideline sentences. 363 Then Dillon argues that this data
shows that the Sentencing Guidelines strongly influence district courts'
sentencing decisions. 364 He concludes that this lack of discretion shows
that the defendant will receive an increased punishment if a judge is
allowed to consider the version of the Guidelines in effect at sentencing,
assuming that version specifies a harsher punishment than the version in
effect at the time of the defendant's offense. 365
The first flaw with this line of reasoning is with the empirical data itself.
The data showing a large rate of compliance among the district courts only
extends from the Gall and Kimbrough decisions through September 30,
2008-between nine and ten months.366 As a preliminary concern, Dillon
does not justify that this is a long enough time period to glean any
sentencing trends. 367 This Note does not dive into a complex statistical
analysis, but there are reasons to wait for more data. The original
sentencing in some of these cases might have taken place before Booker
under a mandatory regime. 368 The precedent from Gall and Kimbrough
might take longer to filter down to district courts than it has to circuit
courts. Also, circuit courts have issued decisions close to or after
September 30, 2008, trumpeting how deferential they are to lenient
sentencing departures, 369 which undermines the relevance of this data
sample to the conclusion that the Guidelines are still effectively mandatory.
Thus, circuit courts should take care before declaring that the Ex Post Facto
Clause applies to the Guidelines because this decision will tilt the
Guidelines toward the "mandatory"--and unconstitutional-end of the
spectrum.
Further, Dillon includes government-sponsored sentences below the
Guidelines as within-Guidelines sentences, as the Sentencing Commission
instructs. 370 However, government-sponsored sentences should not be in
the data sample because it is impossible to say what the sentence would
363. See supra notes 337-42 and accompanying text. The latest data from the Sentencing
Commission shows the compliance rate to be substantially unchanged since the Dillon
article. See supra note 341.
364. See supra notes 337-42 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 337-42 and accompanying text.
366. See GALL REPORT 1I, supra note 228, tbl. 1 n. 1.
367. See Dillon, supra note 56, at 1091-92. At least one commentator thinks that the data
will change in light of Gall and Kimbrough. See Richman, supra note 2, at 1412.
368. See, e.g., supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
369. See, e.g., supra notes 242-45 and accompanying text. The D.C. Circuit decided
United States v. Gardellini on November 14, 2008. 545 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In this
opinion, the D.C. Circuit cited other circuits that issued opinions close to or after September
30, 2008. See id. at 1094 n.5 (citing, e.g., United States v. Thurston, 544 F.3d 22 (1st Cir.
2008) (decided on Oct. 2, 2008); United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2008)
(decided on Sept. 18, 2008)).
370. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
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have been if left solely to the judge's discretion. Tables 1 and 2 of this
Note compare the percentage of within-Guidelines sentences including and
excluding government-sponsored lenient sentences. 371  The overall
percentage of within-Guidelines sentences is less when excluding the
government-sponsored lenient sentences, which results in more discretion
under Dillon's reasoning.
The data regarding the appellate statistics is irrelevant because it comes
from a report that the New York Council of Defense Lawyers submitted as
an amicus curiae brief in Rita, a case that the Supreme Court decided before
Gall and Kimbrough.372 The data for the time period before Rita is
irrelevant because Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough were the cases in which the
Court clarified the sentencing procedure and emphasized the abuse-of-
discretion standard in the review process. Indeed, the Booker opinion does
not mention abuse-of-discretion explicitly,373 notwithstanding the Court's
statement in Gall that Booker's discussion of the standard of review was
extremely clear.374 As discussed above, this abuse-of-discretion standard
allows for significant discretion on the part of sentencing judges.375
Further, the decisions in Gall, Kimbrough, and many appellate court cases
since those, have affirmed lenient sentences, 376 demonstrating that district
court judges have real discretion and are exercising it.
The second flaw with this reasoning is the assumption that the data
conclusively shows that district courts lack sentencing discretion. If
anything, the data that Dillon cites shows an increase in discretion by
sentencing judges. The data that Dillon relies on shows that the rate of
within-Guidelines sentences has decreased by about 9% since the Gall
decision.377  Further, this 9% decline seems significant by Dillon's
standards. In Forman, a 75.4% compliance rate was low enough for the
Third Circuit to exclude the Parole Guidelines from Ex Post Facto Clause
scrutiny. 378 According to Dillon, an approximately 85% rate of within-
Guidelines sentences is so high that the Sentencing Guidelines should be
considered "laws." 379  However, the 9% decline in within-Guidelines
sentences since Booker is already about halfway to the rate of compliance in
371. See GALL REPORT II, supra note 228, tbls.1-2.
372. See supra notes 236, 338 and accompanying text; see also Richman, supra note 2, at
1412 ("[T]he strict appellate review given to non-Guidelines sentences can be expected to
change in light of Gall and Kimbrough." (citing United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Williams, 517 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2008); Memorandum from
Jennifer Coffin to Sentencing Reform Comm. (Jan. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.fd.org/pdf lib/case%20review%20post%20gall-kimbrough%201 1608.pdf)).
373. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
374. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
375. See supra Part I.D.4.
376. See supra Part I.D.4; supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
377. The rate of compliance was 93.7% in the thirteen months before Blakely v.
Washington, compared to 84.8% in the first quarter of 2008 after Gall. Dillon, supra note 56,
at 1090. This data includes government-sponsored lenient sentences.
378. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
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Forman. Also, Forman does not provide a threshold for when a "law"
becomes "advisory," just one rate that the court deems low enough. With
the Gall and Kimbrough decisions being so recent, the rate of within-
Guidelines sentences could still fall in a few years to a level that would
have been acceptable to the court in Forman.
Further, the post-Gall sentencing data excluding prosecution-sponsored
departures shows that the Guidelines are extremely close to the "advisory"
regime in Forman. The overall rate of agreement between district courts
and the Guidelines is 79.3%.380 This rate is much closer to the 74.5%
acceptable rate of agreement in Forman than the rate including prosecution-
sponsored departures, 84.5%.381 The Second Circuit has an agreement rate
of 60.3%/--well below the threshold rate in Forman.382 In fact, six out of
the twelve circuits with available data have an agreement rate lower than
the rate in Forman if prosecution-sponsored departures are excluded. 383
The third flaw is the more general problem of using percentages to decide
this constitutional issue. Picking a specific threshold percentage of
compliance to show that the Guidelines are mandatory-and thus subject to
the Ex Post Facto Clause-is somewhat arbitrary. The relevance of this
percentage of compliance is diminished when it is the sole basis for such a
conclusion. The Supreme Court has already rejected strict mathematical
tests in a related context-a judge does not have to supply mathematically
proportional compelling evidence to justify a departure from the
Guidelines. 384  As Dillon's article and this Note show, different
interpretations of the numbers can lead to wildly different conclusions.
There is no way to justify a strict percentage cutoff of within-Guidelines
sentences that should trigger Ex Post Facto Clause scrutiny. The empirical
data only shows the results of many cases, but the Gall and Kimbrough
decisions emphasized an individualized application of the § 3553(a) factors
to the defendant 385-the data simply cannot or has not yet been able to
capture "the totality of the circumstances." 386
Many reasons for the "high" rate of within-Guidelines sentences could
exist, not all of which indicate that the Ex Post Facto Clause should apply to
the Guidelines. This uncertainty further diminishes the importance of the
rate of compliance in determining this issue. First, a high rate could mean
that a judge is "forced" to comply with the Guidelines because appellate
courts reverse the majority of deviations from the Guidelines. Surely, under
Garner, the Ex Post Facto Clause should apply in this case. Second, judges
might feel like they must comply even though they do not actually test an
appellate court by deviating. A plain-text interpretation of Garner seems to
380. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
381. See supra tbl.2.
382. See supra tbl.
383. See supra tbl.1.
384. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
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indicate that it should apply in this situation because a harsher version of
the Guidelines would result in a longer sentence for the defendant.
Finally, a high rate of correlation could simply mean that judges usually
agree with the Guidelines based on an independent assessment. In this
case, a judge has exercised discretion. The only basis that the Ex Post
Facto Clause should apply is an inference that the judge will likely follow
the Guidelines in one case because they have at other times,387 which is
simply not that reasonable because the circumstances and characteristics of
every defendant are different. If a judge exercises discretion, the link to the
legislature, the Sentencing Guidelines, has not forced the judge's decision,
and thus the Ex Post Facto Clause should not apply. In summary, the
problem with using the rate of within-Guidelines sentences to decide
whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applies is that it does not help to
distinguish what factors drive a sentencing judge's decision in a particular
case.
While the percentage of within-Guidelines sentences should not be the
touchstone in the ex post facto inquiry for all the reasons above, it is not
irrelevant to the issue. A high percentage should be one factor in
determining whether the Ex Post Facto Clause controls the Guidelines. A
100% compliance rate would be a strong indication that the Ex Post Facto
Clause should apply. However, other factors that should play a role in the
analysis include statements by the Supreme Court on the appropriate
sentencing procedure and standard of review, as well as a careful analysis
of appellate courts' review of sentencing decisions.388
In Gall and Kimbrough, the Supreme Court made it clear that the
Guidelines are advisory and that appellate courts should review sentences
for abuse-of-discretion, a very lenient standard. 389  Recently, many
appellate courts have abided by this standard to affirm sentences below the
Guidelines' recommended range. 390 A high rate of within-Guidelines
sentences combined with lenient appellate review suggests that sentencing
judges do have free reign, but they usually just agree with the Guidelines.
In this case, it is difficult to tell what would happen if the judge had a
choice between older, more lenient Guidelines and newer, harsher
Guidelines. The conclusion that a judge will choose the newer Guidelines
is questionable when the only justification is a high rate of compliance with
the Guidelines in general, for all the reasons discussed. Thus, it is difficult
to say that the defendant is at a significant risk of increased punishment and
that the Ex Post Facto Clause should apply under Garner.391 In light of all
of the doubts about the reliability of the rate of within-Guidelines Sentences
387. See, e.g., supra note 315 and accompanying text.
388. Cf Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 255 (2000) (emphasizing the general operation of
the entire parole system rather than specific rules); supra note 51 and accompanying text.
389. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007); supra note 204 and
accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
2664 [Vol. 77
DEFENDING DEMAREE
in contrast to the recent cases from the Supreme Court and courts of appeals
affirming lenient sentences, the Ex Post Facto Clause should not apply to
the Sentencing Guidelines.
C. The Impracticality of Characterizing the Sentencing Guidelines as
"Laws" Under the Ex Post Facto Clause
Judges could easily circumvent a rule that the Ex Post Facto Clause did
apply to the Sentencing Guidelines. As the Demaree court said, judges who
wished to use the Guidelines in force at the time of sentencing could say
that, in following the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), they were using the
information in the new Guidelines rather than rigidly following them. 392
Further, any judge who used the new set of Guidelines in this manner to
increase a defendant's punishment could not be acting unreasonably if the
sentence fell within the range of the Guidelines in effect at sentencing. 393
Eighth Circuit jurisprudence is an example of the impracticality of a rule
declaring that the Ex Post Facto Clause is applicable to the Sentencing
Guidelines. In Carter, the Eighth Circuit held that the Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibited a judge from using a postoffense version of the Guidelines if that
version specified a harsher punishment than a preoffense version. 394
However, in United States v. Larrabee395, the Eighth Circuit looked to
postoffense amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines when assessing the
reasonableness of a defendant's sentence. 396  The court in Larrabee
affirmed a sentence greater than the recommended range in the preoffense
version of the Guidelines. 397 Further, the Eighth Circuit later affirmed this
approach in Carter even while explicitly rejecting the Seventh Circuit's
holding in Demaree that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the
Sentencing Guidelines after Booker.398  Carter demonstrates the
impracticality of trying to prevent sentencing judges from looking to a
postoffense version of the Guidelines for reasonableness. If judges can do
this despite a rule saying the Ex Post Facto Clause bars the application of
the postoffense version, the Clause is not a significant barrier at all. In
Turner, the D.C. Circuit refused to believe that sentencing judges would
look to postoffense amendments to justify the reasonableness of their
sentences. 399 The court characterized this practice as "misrepresent[ing] the
true basis for their actions." 400 However, the example of the Eighth Circuit
in Carter and Larrabee shows that this practice exists-at least at the
appellate level. Further, this example shows that a judge will not
392. See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 287, 291-92 and accompanying text.
395. 436 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2006).
396. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
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necessarily misrepresent the reason for the sentence, but may openly look to
postoffense amendments to determine the reasonableness of a sentence.
CONCLUSION
The Ex Post Facto Clause should not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines
because they are advisory and not "laws." In Booker, the Supreme Court
made the Guidelines advisory in order to avoid a Sixth Amendment
problem in which the defendant is deprived of his right to trial by jury.401
Since Booker, the Court has only ruled in favor of giving the sentencing
judge discretion to depart from the Guidelines' recommended range. As in
Gall, a sentencing judge may rely on the other statutory factors that he or
she thinks warrant a departure from a particular sentence. 402  Under
Kimbrough, the judge may disagree with the policy behind a particular
sentence and impose a sentence that he or she thinks is sufficient, but not
greater than necessary. 40 3  This discretion, subject only to review for
abuse,404 highlights the advisory nature of sentencing today. At a
sentencing hearing, a criminal has no right to a particular sentence, other
than within the statutory limits, because of this discretion. Thus, the Ex
Post Facto Clause does not protect him from a judge looking to the version
of the Sentencing Guidelines in effect on the day of sentencing, even if that
version suggests a more severe penalty than the version in effect on the date
of the offense.
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit that has ruled that the Ex Post
Facto Clause does not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines. 40 5 The circuit
courts that still apply the Ex Post Facto Clause to the Sentencing Guidelines
ignore the holdings in Booker, Gall, and Kimbrough that favor sentencing
discretion. These circuits also ignore the reality that judges could
circumvent a rule saying that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to the
Guidelines. A judge could overtly cite an aggravating factor from the
postoffense version of the Guidelines. The judge could also explain, in an
opinion, that a departure from the preoffense version of the Guidelines was
based on the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) besides the Sentencing
Guidelines. An appellate court would have difficulty saying that such
departures are unreasonable given that the Sentencing Commission
specifically endorses them in a postoffense version of the Guidelines.
Finally, these circuits ignore decisions among themselves applying a lenient
abuse-of-discretion standard to sentencing decisions. These decisions
emphasize that the Guidelines are advisory and thus constitutional under
401. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 188, 206 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 210-11, 222-25 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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Booker. These circuits should be consistent406 and hold that the Guidelines'
advisory nature puts them out of the reach of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
406. Compare, e.g., United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(positing that Guidelines significantly control district court sentencing decisions), with
United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1090, 1094 n.5, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(discussing the substantial deference appellate courts show to district courts' sentencing
decisions, the advisory nature of the Guidelines, and how it is not the role of the courts to
preserve quasi-mandatory Guidelines and, even positively citing Demaree).
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